Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether a public notice issued under Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 could override or amend an Open General Licence order made under the same statutory power and thereby restrict import already covered by the existing policy; (ii) Whether the petitioner, having acted on the earlier import policy by opening an irrevocable letter of credit and entering into a firm commitment, could invoke promissory estoppel against the respondents.
Issue (i): Whether a public notice issued under Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 could override or amend an Open General Licence order made under the same statutory power and thereby restrict import already covered by the existing policy.
Analysis: The Open General Licence order was treated as an exercise of subordinate legislative power, whereas the impugned public notice was treated as an executive communication issued for policy guidance. The Court held that where there is a conflict between a statutory order issued under Section 3 and a subsequent public notice, the public notice cannot amend or supersede the statutory order. The earlier Open General Licence regime continued to govern the import, and the public notice had no legal effect of altering that position.
Conclusion: The public notice could not amend the Open General Licence order and did not validly prohibit the petitioner's import.
Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner, having acted on the earlier import policy by opening an irrevocable letter of credit and entering into a firm commitment, could invoke promissory estoppel against the respondents.
Analysis: The petitioner had altered its position in reliance on the earlier policy by entering into contractual commitments and opening an irrevocable letter of credit. The change introduced by the public notice was held not to defeat the legitimate expectation created by the earlier policy, particularly when the petitioner had already acted to its detriment. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was therefore applied against the Government in the facts of the case.
Conclusion: Promissory estoppel applied in favour of the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The impugned show cause notice was held to be without jurisdiction, and the petitioners were found entitled to relief because the import remained governed by the earlier Open General Licence order.
Ratio Decidendi: An executive public notice under Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 cannot override a subordinate legislative order already issued under that provision, and where an importer has acted to its detriment on the basis of the existing policy, promissory estoppel may bar the State from enforcing the later contrary notice.