Double punishment under overlapping liability provisions is impermissible; regulatory powers do not themselves create a separate offence.

Section 34(1) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 fastens liability on persons in charge of a business, while section 34(2) applies where culpability arises from consent, connivance, or neglect; the two provisions cannot be used to impose double punishment for the same offence on the same factual basis. Packing of drugs may amount to manufacture under section 3(f), and stock kept for sale outside the licence can attract section 18(c). Section 22(1)(c) confers search, seizure, and prohibition powers only and does not itself create a separate penal offence, although the underlying conduct may remain punishable under the relevant rule and penalty provision.

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Issues: (i) Whether a person already liable as a partner or person in charge under section 34(1) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 could be additionally punished under section 34(2) for the same offence; (ii) whether the conviction and sentences for offences under sections 18(c), 18A, 18(a)(i), and 18(a)(vi) were sustainable, including the separate conviction under section 22(1)(c).

Issue (i): Whether a person already liable as a partner or person in charge under section 34(1) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 could be additionally punished under section 34(2) for the same offence.

Analysis: Section 34(1) fastens liability on persons in charge of the business of a firm, while section 34(2) operates on directors or officers whose culpability arises from consent, connivance, or neglect. Where the third appellant was already found guilty with the aid of section 34(1), the further invocation of section 34(2) for the same offence was impermissible. The provisions could not be used to impose a second punishment on the same factual basis.

Conclusion: The additional punishment imposed on the third appellant under section 34(2) was illegal and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the conviction and sentences for offences under sections 18(c), 18A, 18(a)(i), and 18(a)(vi) were sustainable, including the separate conviction under section 22(1)(c).

Analysis: Packing of drugs amounted to manufacture within section 3(f), and the stock kept for sale outside the licence attracted section 18(c). The penalty under section 27(a)(ii) required imprisonment, not fine alone, for the offence under section 18(c), subject to the statutory discretion for special reasons. For contravention of section 18A, section 28 prescribed imprisonment or fine up to five hundred rupees or both, so the fine of two thousand rupees was excessive. In the second appeal, ignorance of quality was no defence under section 19(1), so the convictions under sections 18(a)(i) and 18(a)(vi) were upheld. However, section 22(1)(c) conferred powers of search, seizure, and prohibition only and did not create a separate offence; the corresponding conviction was therefore unsustainable, though the conduct remained punishable under Rule 54A read with section 27(b).

Conclusion: The convictions were substantially maintained, but the matter was remitted for reconsideration of sentence in the first appeal and the separate conviction under section 22(1)(c) in the second appeal was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded only to a limited extent by deleting the impermissible additional punishment and the unsupported separate conviction, while affirming the substantive findings of guilt and remitting sentencing issues for fresh consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute creates distinct bases of liability, the same person cannot be punished twice for the same offence on overlapping provisions, and a provision conferring regulatory powers does not create a separate penal offence unless the statute expressly so provides.

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