Emergency university appointment power remains tentative until confirmation; fraud allegations need particulars before injunction can issue.

Emergency appointment power exercised by a Vice-Chancellor was only tentative and not final unless confirmed by the competent Executive Committee, because the statutory scheme preserved the ordinary appointing authority's role. Allegations of fraud or collusion in selection records required specific particulars and were not established by general assertions alone. Injunctive relief to restrain a university from acting on the appointment was therefore inappropriate where no strong prima facie case was shown, and the restraint could not be continued.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Vice-Chancellor's action under the emergency provision was final or only tentative, requiring confirmation by the Executive Committee; (ii) whether the allegation of fraud or collusion in the selection records was sufficiently pleaded and proved; (iii) whether an injunction should be granted to restrain the University from dealing with the appointment.

Issue (i): Whether the Vice-Chancellor's action under the emergency provision was final or only tentative, requiring confirmation by the Executive Committee.

Analysis: The emergency power was intended for exceptional situations requiring immediate action, but the statutory scheme required the Vice-Chancellor to report the action to the authority that would ordinarily deal with the matter. That structure showed that the Vice-Chancellor's action could not be treated as an absolute and final appointment independent of the normal appointing body. The ordinary power to appoint teachers and to define conditions of service remained with the Executive Committee, and the emergency action had to be placed before it for confirmation. Until such confirmation, the appointment was not final.

Conclusion: The Vice-Chancellor's action was only tentative and remained subject to confirmation by the Executive Committee.

Issue (ii): Whether the allegation of fraud or collusion in the selection records was sufficiently pleaded and proved.

Analysis: A party relying on fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, or similar allegations must give specific particulars in the pleadings. General assertions of collusion were insufficient, and no concrete facts, dates, or details were supplied to support the allegation. The surrounding circumstances and the state of the records did not establish dishonest manipulation on the material before the Court.

Conclusion: The allegation of fraud or collusion was not proved.

Issue (iii): Whether an injunction should be granted to restrain the University from dealing with the appointment.

Analysis: Courts should be slow to interfere by injunction in the internal administration of educational institutions, and relief should be granted only when a strong prima facie case is shown. On the findings available, the plaintiff failed to establish such a case. The University's action could not be treated as collusive or inoperative, and no sufficient ground existed for continuing the restraint.

Conclusion: The injunction ought not to have been granted or continued.

Final Conclusion: The decree of the High Court could not stand, the restraint on the University was lifted, and the trial court's decision was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Emergency statutory power exercised by the Vice-Chancellor was not final unless confirmed by the competent regular authority, and allegations of fraud must be pleaded with full particulars before equitable relief such as injunction can be granted.

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