Article 14 challenge to territorial sanction requirement failed, but the substantive arms offence remained valid under severability.

Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878 was discriminatory and void under Article 14 because its sanction-for-prosecution scheme depended on a historical territorial classification that no longer had a rational nexus with the statute's object. The provision was nevertheless severable, so striking down the defective procedural safeguard did not affect the substantive offence under section 19(f), which remained valid because the offence was complete independently of sanction. The Court also rejected the challenge based on the nature of the pistol and the alleged uneven practice in launching prosecutions, finding no unconstitutional discrimination on those grounds.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878 was unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution of India for making sanction for prosecution depend on the area where the offence was committed; (ii) whether section 29 was severable so that its invalidity did not affect section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act, 1878; (iii) whether the additional challenges relating to the fitness of the pistol and alleged discrimination in launching prosecutions had merit.

Issue (i): Whether section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878 was unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution of India for making sanction for prosecution depend on the area where the offence was committed.

Analysis: The classification created by section 29 rested on a historical distinction between territories north of the Jumna and Ganga and other areas. That distinction had its origin in conditions prevailing during the disturbances of 1857, but it no longer bore any reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. A geographical classification is permissible only if it has a rational nexus with the statutory object. The section therefore made an arbitrary and discriminatory distinction between persons similarly situated.

Conclusion: Section 29 was held to be unconstitutional and void as offending Article 14.

Issue (ii): Whether section 29 was severable so that its invalidity did not affect section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act, 1878.

Analysis: Section 19(f) created the offence, while section 29 was merely procedural and came into operation only after the offence was complete. The protection afforded by sanction was not an ingredient of the offence itself. Striking down the discriminatory part of section 29 could not be used to rewrite the section so as to impose sanction where the statute expressly excluded it, and the vice of discrimination affected the section as a whole. At the same time, the invalidity of the procedural safeguard did not destroy the substantive penal provision.

Conclusion: Section 29 was severable, and its invalidity did not affect the validity of section 19(f).

Issue (iii): Whether the remaining challenges relating to the pistol and alleged unequal prosecution practice had merit.

Analysis: The contention that the pistol was not an arm within section 4(1) was rejected. The complaint that prosecutions were launched with and without sanction did not establish unconstitutional discrimination.

Conclusion: Both contentions were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The statutory offence remained enforceable, the procedural defect did not invalidate the substantive penal provision, and the convictions were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a procedural safeguard in a criminal statute is discriminatory and violates Article 14, the safeguard may be struck down without invalidating the substantive offence if the offence is complete independently of that safeguard and the legislative scheme shows that the penal provision can stand on its own.

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