Judicial bail orders cannot be rescinded under general clauses powers; cancellation depends on the facts and proper jurisdiction.

The Sessions Court had no power to cancel a judicial bail order because cancellation under the Code was confined to the limited field where release was ordered by the trial Magistrate, while residual interference rested only with the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was held to apply to non-judicial notifications, rules and bye-laws, so it did not authorise rescission of a judicial bail order. On the facts, apprehension of witness tampering justified cancellation only for one applicant, while bail was maintained for the other, subject to furnishing bond and sureties.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Sessions Court had power to cancel an earlier order granting bail in a case pending inquiry before a Magistrate; (ii) whether section 21 of the General Clauses Act authorized cancellation of a judicial bail order; and (iii) whether, on the facts, bail should be cancelled for both applicants.

Issue (i): Whether the Sessions Court had power to cancel an earlier order granting bail in a case pending inquiry before a Magistrate

Analysis: The power to grant and cancel bail under the Code was examined with reference to the scheme of sections 497, 498 and 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, together with the limited scope of section 497(5). The cancellation power under that provision was held to operate only where the release order was made by the trial Magistrate. Outside that field, the High Court's authority to interfere with bail orders was traced to its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, but no such inherent power was available to the Court of Session, which was not seized of the inquiry and had no corresponding source of residual jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The Sessions Court had no power to cancel its predecessor's bail order.

Issue (ii): Whether section 21 of the General Clauses Act authorized cancellation of a judicial bail order

Analysis: Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was held to apply to powers to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws in the non-judicial sense. Applying the ejusdem generis principle, the expression "orders" in that provision was read in the company of notifications, rules and bye-laws, and therefore confined to non-judicial orders. Judicial bail orders, being governed by procedural law, were excluded from its scope.

Conclusion: Section 21 of the General Clauses Act did not authorize rescission of a judicial bail order.

Issue (iii): Whether, on the facts, bail should be cancelled for both applicants

Analysis: On the materials before the Court, apprehension of tampering with and intimidation of witnesses was considered sufficient in the case of one applicant, but not in the case of the other. The Court therefore exercised its inherent power only to the extent justified by the facts proved before it.

Conclusion: Bail was cancelled only for Bachchu Lal and maintained for Debi Dayal, who was directed to be enlarged on bail upon furnishing sureties and bond.

Final Conclusion: The decision negated the Sessions Court's power to cancel a judicial bail order under the Code or section 21 of the General Clauses Act, while granting partial relief on the merits by sustaining bail for one applicant and cancelling it for the other.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court's inherent power to cancel bail exists only in the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not extend to judicial orders.

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