Charge need not state exact dates if reasonable notice is given and no prejudice is shown.

A charge is not invalid merely because it states a period rather than exact dates and times, where it gives reasonable notice of the accusation and no prejudice is shown. An appellate court may summarily dismiss a criminal appeal if, on perusal, it finds no sufficient ground for interference. The jury directions on corroboration, the girl's age, and the use of prior statements were held to be fair and adequate, and the verdict was not perverse merely because the evidence was unsatisfactory or dependent mainly on the prosecutrix. The conviction and sentence were therefore left undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) Whether a charge is invalid merely because it specifies a period rather than exact dates and times of the alleged offence; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in summarily dismissing the criminal appeal; (iii) Whether the jury charge suffered from material misdirection regarding the validity of the charge, the need for corroboration of the prosecutrix, the girl's age, and the use of previous statements; (iv) Whether the Sessions Judge was bound to treat the jury verdict as perverse.

Issue (i): Whether a charge is invalid merely because it specifies a period rather than exact dates and times of the alleged offence.

Analysis: The requirement that a charge contain particulars as to time and place is intended to give the accused reasonable notice of the accusation. Exact dates are not invariably essential. The degree of precision depends on the nature of the accusation and the information available to the prosecution. A charge framed with a limited period may be sufficient where the facts do not permit greater exactitude, and a defect becomes material only if prejudice is shown.

Conclusion: The charge was not invalid merely because it alleged periods within which the offences were committed; no prejudice warranting interference was established.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in summarily dismissing the criminal appeal.

Analysis: The appellate court is empowered to dismiss an appeal summarily if, on perusal, it finds no sufficient ground for interference. Summary dismissal does not mean absence of judicial application of mind. Where the court considers the appeal unsubstantial, it may decline to admit it without recording detailed reasons.

Conclusion: The summary dismissal of the appeal by the High Court did not furnish a ground for relief to the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the jury charge suffered from material misdirection regarding the validity of the charge, the need for corroboration of the prosecutrix, the girl's age, and the use of previous statements.

Analysis: The question of validity of the charge had already been decided against the appellant and in favour of the prosecution, so the jury was not prejudiced by the reference made by the Sessions Judge. The directions on corroboration of the prosecutrix were fair and adequately cautioned the jury. The burden on the prosecution to prove the girl's age was sufficiently explained. The prior statement of the girl was correctly treated as material for contradiction and not as substantive evidence.

Conclusion: No material misdirection was made out in the jury charge.

Issue (iv): Whether the Sessions Judge was bound to treat the jury verdict as perverse.

Analysis: Even where the evidence is not entirely satisfactory, the jury remains the final arbiter of facts in a jury trial. A verdict does not become perverse merely because the Judge considers it surprising or because the prosecution case rested heavily on the prosecutrix's testimony. The verdict could not be rejected as illegal or perverse on the record.

Conclusion: The Sessions Judge was not bound to treat the jury verdict as perverse.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were left undisturbed and the appellant obtained no relief in the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: A charge is not vitiated for want of exact dates if it gives reasonable notice and causes no prejudice, and a criminal appeal may be summarily dismissed where the appellate court finds no sufficient ground for interference.

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