Special statute limits general powers: State could not replace a Commission's sole member under the General Clauses Act.

Where a special statute expressly governs constitution, vacancy and discontinuance of a Commission of Inquiry, the general power under the General Clauses Act cannot be used to substitute its sole member and reconstitute the body. Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 authorised constitution and appointment, Section 3(3) limited post-constitution action to filling a vacancy, Section 7 provided the only mode of rescission, and Section 8-A preserved continuity during vacancy or change. The Supreme Court held that invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would conflict with those express limits and undermine the Commission's independence. The State Government therefore had no power to replace the sole member, and the notifications were invalid.

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Issues: Whether the State Government could reconstitute a Commission of Inquiry constituted under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 by replacing its sole member through Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, when the Act itself provides only for filling a vacancy and for cessation of the Commission in the manner specified therein.

Analysis: The statutory scheme shows that the power to constitute the Commission and appoint its member is contained in Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, while Section 3(3) specifically limits post-constitution intervention to filling a vacancy in the office of a member. Section 7 separately provides the only mode of rescinding the Commission by notification when its continuance is unnecessary, and Section 8-A merely ensures that an inquiry is not interrupted by vacancy or change in constitution. In this setting, the general power in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 cannot be used to enlarge the Government's authority to substitute the sole member of an existing Commission, because such a construction would conflict with the express and implied limitations in the special Act and undermine the intended independence of the inquiry.

Conclusion: The State Government had no power to replace the sole member of the Commission by invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the impugned notifications were invalid.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the High Court's quashing of the notifications failed, and the dismissal of the appeals left the Commission to proceed only in accordance with the original statutory framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute expressly regulates constitution, vacancy, and discontinuance of a Commission, the general power to amend or vary notifications under the General Clauses Act cannot be used to substitute the existing member and reconstitute the Commission in a manner not authorized by the special Act.

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