Workman status turns on actual duties, and a shorter local limitation cannot curtail a concurrent statutory remedy.

Employee status under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act depends on the substance of the duties actually performed, not the label attached to the post. Routine checking and reporting on behalf of management do not by themselves make an employee a supervisor; supervisory status requires authority to direct work or exercise independent judgment over other employees. On the evidence, the respondent's functions were mainly reporting and checking, so he was treated as a workman. Section 28A of the Rajasthan Shops & Establishments Act did not create repugnancy with the Industrial Disputes Act or curtail that remedy, because the two enactments operated as supplemental rather than inconsistent measures, and the shorter limitation period did not limit the wider industrial dispute remedy.

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Issues: (i) Whether the respondent was a workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; (ii) Whether section 28A of the Rajasthan Shops & Establishments Act, 1958 created any repugnancy or curtailed the respondent's remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent was a workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Analysis: The decisive test is the nature of the main duties actually performed. A person is not a supervisor merely because he checks work or reports on behalf of management. Supervisory employment requires authority to direct, bind, or exercise independent judgment in relation to other employees, and not merely routine checking. The evidence showed that the respondent's duties were chiefly reporting and checking, without any independent power to take decisions binding on the employer.

Conclusion: The respondent was a workman and not a supervisor.

Issue (ii): Whether section 28A of the Rajasthan Shops & Establishments Act, 1958 created any repugnancy or curtailed the respondent's remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Analysis: Repugnancy arises only where the laws operate in the same field and are inconsistent so that one cannot prevail with the other. Although both enactments dealt with redress against dismissal or discharge, they were held to be supplemental rather than inconsistent. The limitation period in section 28A could not be read as restricting the wider remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act, especially in light of the saving provision in section 37 of the Rajasthan Act.

Conclusion: There was no repugnancy, and the Industrial Disputes Act remedy was not curtailed.

Final Conclusion: The respondent's status as a workman and the availability of relief under the Industrial Disputes Act were upheld, and the appeals failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Whether an employee is a workman depends on the substance of the duties actually performed, and a law providing a shorter limitation period for a local remedy does not curtail a concurrent statutory remedy unless the two enactments are truly inconsistent.

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