Arbitrator bias requires a real and reasonable likelihood of bias; alleged remarks and procedural rulings were insufficient here.

Revocation of an arbitrator's authority on alleged bias requires a real and reasonable likelihood of bias, assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable informed person, and the court must also be satisfied that refusal would cause substantial miscarriage of justice. Alleged remarks, without timely objection and in the context of ongoing participation, did not establish bias. Refusal to permit oral evidence, where supported by reasons based on the record and case management, did not by itself prove mala fides or partiality. Assertions of personal interest, removal in another matter, and challenge to the fee schedule also failed on the facts, leaving no ground to disqualify the arbitrator.

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Issues: Whether the authority of the arbitrator should be revoked on the ground of bias or disqualification arising from alleged remarks, refusal to permit oral evidence, alleged personal interest in the proceedings, and the circumstance that he had been removed in another matter.

Analysis: The governing test for removal of an arbitrator on the ground of bias is not mere suspicion but a real and reasonable likelihood of bias, viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable person having relevant information. In the arbitral context, the court must also be satisfied that refusal of the application would result in substantial miscarriage of justice, and the discretion to revoke authority must be exercised cautiously and sparingly. On the first ground, the alleged remark concerning photocopy expenses did not, in the circumstances, establish bias. The appellant participated in subsequent proceedings without timely objection, and the objection was therefore treated as waived. The surrounding facts, including the large monetary claims on both sides, showed that the remark could not reasonably support an inference of partiality. On the second ground, the refusal to permit oral evidence was based on a reasoned order referring to the pleadings, documents on record, the absence of essential records from the appellant, and the need to conclude the matter within time. Even if the refusal were assumed to be erroneous or to amount to procedural impropriety, that would not by itself prove bias. A finding of bias from refusal of evidence requires proof of mala fides or a deliberate intention to make one side fail, which was absent. On the third ground, the arbitrator's statement about his expenses and prestige did not show personal interest amounting to disqualification. The record showed that travel expenses were largely adjusted against other proceedings and that the financial burden on the parties was not established. The fourth ground, based on removal of the arbitrator in another case, had no substance, especially when that circumstance was based on consent. The subsidiary challenge to the fee schedule also failed because the appellant continued to participate after receiving it, and the proposed fee was not shown to be disproportionate.

Conclusion: The allegations did not establish a reasonable likelihood of bias or any ground warranting revocation of the arbitrator's authority, and the application for removal failed.

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