Contractual time limit in arbitration can end the arbitrator's mandate, but participation without timely protest may waive the objection.

A contractual time limit for making an arbitral award is enforceable and may, if unextended, render the arbitrator de jure unable to continue, so the mandate can terminate under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The notes also explain that this effect is subject to waiver or consent by the parties. Where a party knows of the time stipulation but continues participating in the arbitration after expiry without timely protest, files substantive applications, and attends hearings, the conduct may amount to waiver under Section 4 and conscious abandonment of the right to object to continuation.

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Issues: (i) Whether expiry of the contractual six-month period for making the arbitral award terminated the arbitrator's mandate under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (ii) whether the petitioner had waived its right to object to continuation of the arbitral proceedings after expiry of that period.

Issue (i): Whether expiry of the contractual six-month period for making the arbitral award terminated the arbitrator's mandate under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: The arbitration agreement governed the arbitrator's authority, and the time stipulation for making the award was held to be binding unless varied by consent. Failure to make the award within the stipulated period was treated as rendering the arbitrator de jure unable to continue, so the expiry of time could terminate the mandate within Section 14. The absence of an express statutory time limit in the Act did not make the contractual stipulation ineffective.

Conclusion: The expiry of the contractual period was capable of terminating the arbitrator's mandate under Section 14, subject to waiver or consent by the parties.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner had waived its right to object to continuation of the arbitral proceedings after expiry of that period.

Analysis: The petitioner knew of the time stipulation yet continued to participate in the proceedings after expiry of the six-month period without timely protest, including by filing substantive applications and taking part in hearings. On these facts, the objection was held to be waivable under Section 4, and the conduct amounted to conscious abandonment of the right to insist on termination.

Conclusion: The petitioner waived its right to object, so the arbitral proceedings could validly continue.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed because the contractual time-limit objection was held to have been waived, and the arbitral mandate was not required to be treated as terminated on that basis.

Ratio Decidendi: A contractual time limit for making an arbitral award is enforceable, but a party that knowingly participates in the arbitration after expiry of that period without timely objection waives the right to rely on termination of the arbitrator's mandate.

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