Voluntary arbitration remains enforceable without pending suit consent, and prior property litigation does not bar a fresh reference.

Where no suit is pending, parties may enforce an arbitral award made on a voluntary reference without court intervention, and consent at the stage of the award is not required for enforcement. The award was also not invalid merely because Dulari Bahu had not joined the arbitration agreement, since her maintenance rights were not prejudiced and the issue had become academic. Prior litigation concerning the same property did not bar a fresh dispute over that property from being referred to arbitration, as the earlier proceedings did not extinguish the parties' freedom to arbitrate the later controversy. The award was upheld and treated as a valid adjudication between the parties.

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Issues: (i) whether the arbitration reference and award were invalid because Dulari Bahu had not joined the arbitration agreement though her maintenance rights were said to be affected; (ii) whether the award could be enforced despite being made in an out-of-court reference and without all parties signing it; (iii) whether the existence of earlier litigation concerning the property barred the parties from referring the later dispute about that property to arbitration.

Issue (i): whether the arbitration reference and award were invalid because Dulari Bahu had not joined the arbitration agreement though her maintenance rights were said to be affected.

Analysis: The dispute referred to arbitration concerned the houses purchased in court auction, while Dulari Bahu's interest was confined to recovery of maintenance. Her rights under the earlier award remained intact, the maintenance charge was preserved, and the later award did not prejudice her entitlement. In any event, she was not shown to have challenged the arbitration, and the matter had become academic by the time of the decision.

Conclusion: The reference and award were not invalid on the ground that Dulari Bahu had not joined the arbitration agreement.

Issue (ii): whether the award could be enforced despite being made in an out-of-court reference and without all parties signing it.

Analysis: A distinction was drawn between arbitration during the pendency of a suit and arbitration by consent where no suit is pending. Under the proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, court consent is relevant when an award is to operate as a compromise or adjustment of a pending suit. Where no suit is pending and the parties voluntarily refer their dispute to arbitration, consent at the stage of the award is not necessary for enforcement.

Conclusion: The award was valid and enforceable notwithstanding that it arose from an out-of-court reference and was not signed by all parties in token of acceptance.

Issue (iii): whether the existence of earlier litigation concerning the property barred the parties from referring the later dispute about that property to arbitration.

Analysis: The fact that the property had been involved in earlier litigation did not prevent the parties from referring a fresh dispute concerning that property to arbitration. The earlier proceedings might bear upon the later controversy, but they did not extinguish the parties' freedom to arbitrate the new dispute, and it was not shown that the precise dispute in the award had already been adjudicated by a civil court.

Conclusion: The prior litigation did not bar the arbitration reference.

Final Conclusion: The award was upheld and the appeal failed, leaving the award to operate as a valid adjudication between the parties.

Ratio Decidendi: Where no suit is pending, parties may enforce an arbitral award made on a voluntary reference without court intervention, and the mere existence of prior litigation over the subject property does not bar arbitration of a fresh dispute concerning that property.

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