Statutory withdrawal from acquisition must follow law, not oral assurance or executive policy, after section 6 and section 9 stages.
After a section 6 declaration and service of section 9 notice under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, land could be withdrawn only through the statutory procedure and by the competent authority; alleged oral assurances, implied agreements, or executive instructions could not override that mechanism. The Court also treated the relied-on policy on houses within or contiguous to municipal limits as only an executive guideline with no legal force to defeat a lawful acquisition, and found the factual preconditions unmet. Claims of discrimination and objection to separate awards also failed because the other exclusions were either legally justified or unsupported, and separate declarations and awards were permissible.
Issues: (i) Whether an alleged oral or implied assurance by acquisition could operate to withdraw the remaining land from acquisition after publication of the declaration and service of notice; (ii) whether withdrawal from acquisition after the statutory stage had been reached could be effected otherwise than in the manner prescribed by law; (iii) whether the petitioners were entitled to exclusion of their land on the basis of an executive policy concerning houses within or contiguous to municipal limits; and (iv) whether the acquisition suffered from discrimination or illegality because some other lands were excluded and awards were passed separately.
Issue (i): Whether an alleged oral or implied assurance by acquisition authorities could operate to withdraw the remaining land from acquisition after publication of the declaration and service of notice.
Analysis: The alleged agreement was found unsupported by the documents relied upon by the petitioners. The record showed only a voluntary surrender of a portion of the land for advance compensation, together with an undertaking and receipt relating to that surrendered portion. There was no concluded arrangement to exclude the balance. The Court also held that, once the declaration under section 6 had been published and notices under section 9 had been served, no officer could validly promise withdrawal of land from acquisition. After that stage, withdrawal could occur only through the statutory mechanism.
Conclusion: The alleged assurance or implied agreement was not accepted, and the land did not stand released from acquisition.
Issue (ii): Whether withdrawal from acquisition after the statutory stage had been reached could be effected otherwise than in the manner prescribed by law.
Analysis: The Court held that section 21 of the General Clauses Act enables rescission of a notification before the acquisition process reaches the later statutory stage, but after a declaration under section 6 and service of notice under section 9, withdrawal must proceed under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court further held that such withdrawal must be by the competent authority and must be made in the manner required by law, including publication so that affected persons are put on notice and the compensation consequences under section 48(2) are attracted. Executive orders or internal manual instructions could not substitute for the statutory mode.
Conclusion: Withdrawal could not be effected by informal assurance or executive instruction, and no valid statutory withdrawal had taken place.
Issue (iii): Whether the petitioners were entitled to exclusion of their land on the basis of an executive policy concerning houses within or contiguous to municipal limits.
Analysis: The Court held that the letter relied upon by the petitioners was only an executive guideline and had no legal force to defeat acquisition proceedings lawfully initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court further held that the petitioners' property was not within the original municipal limits and was not shown to be contiguous to them in the sense contemplated by the guideline. On the facts, the petitioners' house was too far removed to satisfy the policy condition. Accordingly, the claim for automatic exclusion failed.
Conclusion: The petitioners were not entitled to exclusion of their land on the basis of the policy letter.
Issue (iv): Whether the acquisition suffered from discrimination or illegality because some other lands were excluded and awards were passed separately.
Analysis: The Court held that the instances relied upon by the petitioners were either within the original municipal limits, where exclusion was expressly contemplated, or were otherwise unsupported by proof of any valid withdrawal under section 48. The Court also held that, after the statutory amendment, more than one declaration under section 6 and separate awards were permissible. The challenge based on piecemeal awards therefore failed, and no discriminatory or arbitrary treatment was established.
Conclusion: The plea of discrimination and the objection to separate awards were rejected.
Final Conclusion: The acquisition proceedings were upheld in full, and the petitioners obtained no relief.
Ratio Decidendi: Once a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been published and notice under section 9 has been served, land can be withdrawn from acquisition only by the competent authority acting under the statutory power and in the manner required by law; executive assurances or policy instructions cannot override that procedure.
TaxTMI 
AI Drafter ✕
TaxTMI 
