Circumstantial evidence and benefit of doubt: acquittal upheld where guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In a murder case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, the Court reiterated that conviction is permissible only when every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence is excluded. The prosecution failed to prove motive adequately, and the medical evidence did not conclusively rule out death from epilepsy. As two views on the evidence remained reasonably possible, the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt. The acquittal was therefore not disturbed, because suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.

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Issues: Whether the acquittal in a murder case based on circumstantial evidence called for interference, and whether the prosecution had proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Analysis: The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. The evidence on motive was not sufficient, and the medical evidence did not conclusively exclude the possibility of death from epilepsy. Where two views on the evidence are reasonably possible, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, conviction can follow only when every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence is excluded; suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof.

Conclusion: The acquittal was not liable to be interfered with, as the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ratio Decidendi: In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, an acquittal will not be disturbed unless the circumstances conclusively exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and mere suspicion cannot sustain a conviction.

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