Statutory bar on inquiry against IAS officers overrides broad Lokayukta definitions and preserves neutrality in challenge proceedings

Section 2(m)(iv) of the Delhi Lokayukta and Upalokayukta Act, 1995 was read as broadly covering office-holders in government companies, but Section 17 was treated as an absolute declaratory bar excluding members of the Civil Service of the Union and All India Service from inquiry. An IAS officer on deputation to a government company did not lose that status because of the posting, so the Lokayukta lacked jurisdiction over complaints against such officers. The text also notes that a Lokayukta should not be impleaded or heard to defend a challenged order, because neutrality and the appearance of impartiality require that the successful party defend the decision.

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Issues: (i) Whether an IAS officer on deputation as Chairman, Managing Director, Director or similar office-holder in a government company fell within the definition of "public functionary" under Section 2(m)(iv) of the Delhi Lokayukta and Upalokayukta Act, 1995, so as to be amenable to inquiry by the Lokayukta despite Section 17 of that Act; and (ii) Whether the Lokayukta could be impleaded or heard in support of his own order when that order was under challenge in writ proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether an IAS officer on deputation as Chairman, Managing Director, Director or similar office-holder in a government company fell within the definition of "public functionary" under Section 2(m)(iv) of the Delhi Lokayukta and Upalokayukta Act, 1995, so as to be amenable to inquiry by the Lokayukta despite Section 17 of that Act.

Analysis: Section 2(m)(iv) gave a wide definition of "public functionary" and, read by itself, would have covered office-holders in government companies. Section 17, however, was a declaratory provision stating that nothing in the Act shall authorise inquiry against a member of the Civil Service of the Union or an All India Service. The bar was held to be absolute and not merely procedural. The provision could not be treated as a non-obstante clause, but it operated as a complete exception to Section 2(m)(iv). The Lokayukta was not entitled to add an implied proviso or to carve out an exception not found in the statute. An IAS officer on deputation to a government company did not cease to be an IAS officer merely because of that posting.

Conclusion: The Lokayukta had no jurisdiction to inquire into complaints against the petitioners, who remained members of the IAS and were covered by the prohibition in Section 17.

Issue (ii): Whether the Lokayukta could be impleaded or heard in support of his own order when that order was under challenge in writ proceedings.

Analysis: A decision on jurisdiction taken in an adversarial complaint before the Lokayukta was an adjudicatory act for present purposes, and even apart from that, the office was expected to remain impartial. Once the Lokayukta had taken a view in the pending dispute, the task of defending that view belonged to the successful party, not to the decision-maker. Permitting the Lokayukta to support the challenged order would be inconsistent with the appearance and requirement of neutrality attached to the office.

Conclusion: The Lokayukta could not be impleaded or heard in support of the impugned order.

Final Conclusion: The complaints before the Lokayukta were held to be outside his jurisdiction, the writ petitions succeeded, and the applications by the Lokayukta were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A declaratory statutory bar excluding members of the Civil Service or All India Service from inquiry by the Lokayukta cannot be diluted by reading an implied exception into a wider definition clause, and a decision-maker should not defend its own challenged order where neutrality is required.

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