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<h1>State's Authority to Retain Acquired Land Upheld by Supreme Court</h1> The Supreme Court held that the State Government is not obligated to return acquired land to owners once the purpose of acquisition is fulfilled. The ... Laches and delay in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 - return of acquired land upon fulfillment of public purpose - Paragraph 493 of the Land Administration Manual and Standing Order 28 as discretionary guidance - vesting of acquired land in the State under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act - use of land acquired for one public purpose for another public purposeLaches and delay in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 - The writ petition challenging the acquisition was barred by inordinate delay and laches and therefore not entertainable. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the High Court did not err in refusing to entertain the challenge to acquisition where appellants offered no plausible explanation for the gap of over three decades between issuance of acquisition notifications (1976) and filing of the writ petition (2007). The Constitution Bench authority in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai establishes that although Article 226 proceedings are not formally governed by statutory limitation, unreasonable delay or laches is a sound discretionary ground for denying relief; where delay exceeds ordinary limitation periods it will ordinarily be treated as unreasonable. The Court applied this doctrine and earlier authorities invoking laches to acquisition challenges, concluding that the appellants' long delay disentitled them to relief under Article 226. [Paras 13, 14, 15]Challenge to acquisition dismissed on ground of laches; High Court rightly refused to entertain the belated challenge.Return of acquired land upon fulfillment of public purpose - Paragraph 493 of the Land Administration Manual and Standing Order 28 as discretionary guidance - vesting of acquired land in the State under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act - use of land acquired for one public purpose for another public purpose - There is no legal obligation on the State to restore acquired land to original owners once the specified public purpose is accomplished; Paragraph 493/Standing Order 28 do not create a legal right to mandatory restoration. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined Paragraph 493 of the Land Administration Manual and Standing Order 28 and held that they describe a discretionary practice - the Government 'is usually willing' as a matter of grace to restore land on refunding compensation - and do not impose a binding duty to return land. Reading Paragraph 493 as creating an absolute entitlement would conflict with Section 16 (which vests acquired land in the State free from encumbrances) and established law that land acquired for one public purpose may be utilized for another public purpose. The Court distinguished State of Haryana v. Suraj on its facts, noting that Suraj involved a governmental declaration of surplus and an impermissible transfer contrary to Standing Order 28, and affirmed earlier precedents confirming that relinquishment and disposal must follow statutory and executive norms; where the land was transferred to or used by another public authority (here HSEB/HPGCL) after fulfillment of the acquisition purpose, mandamus to restore cannot be sustained. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]Prayer for mandamus directing return of the acquired land denied; Paragraph 493/Standing Order 28 do not create a mandatory right to restoration and State's transfer/use for other public purposes is permissible.Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed; the High Court correctly refused to entertain the belated challenge to acquisition and correctly declined to direct restoration of the acquired land, since Paragraph 493/Standing Order 28 confer no mandatory right and vested State ownership permits use for other public purposes. Issues Involved:1. Obligation of the State Government to return acquired land after the purpose of acquisition is accomplished.2. Legality of invoking urgency provisions without tangible reason.3. Applicability of Standing Order 28 for the return of acquired land.4. Doctrine of laches and delay in challenging the acquisition.Summary:1. Obligation of the State Government to return acquired land:The primary issue was whether the State Government is obligated to return the acquired land to the owners after the purpose of acquisition is accomplished. The Supreme Court held that Paragraph 493 of the Land Administration Manual does not impose a duty on the State Government to restore the acquired land to the owners. It merely mentions that as a matter of grace, the Government is usually willing to restore agricultural and pastoral land to the owners on their refunding the amount of compensation. The Court emphasized that interpreting Paragraph 493 to mandate the return of land would be contrary to Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which states that the acquired land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances.2. Legality of invoking urgency provisions:The appellants argued that the acquisition was illegal as the State Government invoked the urgency provisions without any tangible reason, depriving the landowners of their right to file objections u/s 5A(1) and to be heard u/s 5A(2). The Supreme Court noted that this plea was raised before the High Court but was not adequately considered. However, the Court did not find merit in this argument due to the significant delay in challenging the acquisition.3. Applicability of Standing Order 28:The appellants relied on Standing Order 28 and the judgment in State of Haryana v. Suraj to argue that the Respondents are duty-bound to return the acquired land. The Supreme Court distinguished the present case from Suraj, noting that in Suraj, the land was declared surplus and was to be disposed of as per Standing Order 28. In contrast, the acquired land in the present case was used for the specified public purpose and later transferred to the Haryana State Electricity Board (HSEB). The Court concluded that the High Court did not err in declining the appellants' prayer for mandamus to return the land.4. Doctrine of laches and delay in challenging the acquisition:The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to reject the appellants' challenge to the acquisition due to an unexplained delay of over three decades. The Court cited the doctrine of laches, as established in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, which allows the High Court to deny relief to a petitioner guilty of laches. The Court emphasized that the delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution was unreasonable and unjustified.Conclusion:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to make out a case for the issue of a mandamus to the Respondents to release the acquired land. The Court affirmed that the acquired land, once vested in the State Government, can be used for any public purpose and is not required to be returned to the original owners.