Court notice starts limitation for arbitral award objections; mere filing, counsel's presence, or endorsements do not suffice.

Limitation for objections to an arbitral award begins only when the court serves notice of the award's filing, not when the award is merely filed in court. The statutory scheme treats court-issued notice as mandatory, and the 30-day period runs from that communication alone. Notice cannot be inferred from a petition to make the award a rule of court, the presence of counsel, or an endorsement on the award, because none substitutes for the court's own notice. The principle applied is that mere knowledge of filing is insufficient where the Act requires formal court notice.

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Issues: (i) Whether the period of limitation for filing objections to an arbitral award commences from the date on which the award is filed in court, or only from the date of service of notice by the court under the Arbitration Act; (ii) whether notice of filing of the award can be inferred from the filing of a petition for making the award a rule of court, the presence of counsel, or an endorsement made on the award.

Issue (i): Whether the period of limitation for filing objections to an arbitral award commences from the date on which the award is filed in court, or only from the date of service of notice by the court under the Arbitration Act.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguished between notice by the arbitrator of making and signing the award and notice by the court of filing of the award. The provision governing filing of the award required the court to give notice to the parties, and the limitation provision tied the 30-day period to service of that court-issued notice. The court's notice could be oral or written, but some communication from the court informing the party of the filing of the award was essential. Mere filing of the award in court did not start limitation.

Conclusion: The period of limitation begins only from service of notice by the court regarding filing of the award, not from the date of filing of the award by the arbitrator.

Issue (ii): Whether notice of filing of the award can be inferred from the filing of a petition for making the award a rule of court, the presence of counsel, or an endorsement made on the award.

Analysis: A petition seeking making the award a rule of court, even if accompanied by a copy of the award, was not treated as a substitute for the court's mandatory notice where the petition and the notice did not disclose that the award had been filed. The mere appearance of counsel, without any communication from the court about filing of the award, was insufficient. An endorsement on the award by government counsel was attributable at best to the arbitrator-side notice and could not replace the court's obligation under the Act.

Conclusion: No valid notice of filing of the award could be inferred from the petition, counsel's presence, or the endorsement on the award.

Final Conclusion: The award could not be made a rule of court before expiry of 30 days from the date on which the court communicated the filing of the award, and the matter was required to be reconsidered after permitting objections to be filed.

Ratio Decidendi: Limitation for objections to an arbitral award commences only upon service of notice by the court of the filing of the award, and such mandatory notice cannot be displaced by mere knowledge, counsel's appearance, or notice attributable to the arbitrator.

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