Preventive attachment under immoral traffic law must follow cognizable penal proceedings when section 3 offence is disclosed.

Section 18 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 was treated as a preventive, premises-focused measure rather than a penal prosecution, so the classification between proceedings under the penal provisions and proceedings under section 18 was held to have a rational relation to the Act's object and was not hit by Article 14. Where the material before the Magistrate disclosed a cognizable offence under section 3, however, the Magistrate was required first to proceed under the penal provision and could resort to section 18 only afterwards if occasion still remained. The preventive power could not be used to bypass cognizable penal proceedings.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 18 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 was ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether, where the facts disclosed a cognizable offence under section 3, the Magistrate could proceed directly under section 18 without first taking action under the penal provision.

Issue (i): Whether section 18 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 was ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Sections 3 and 7 deal with punishment for offences, while section 18 operates as a preventive measure directed to the premises and not as a prosecution of the offender. The two sets of cases are not identical: proceedings under sections 3 and 7 require proof of intention or knowledge and entail a regular trial, whereas section 18 contemplates a summary inquiry confined to the use of premises and provides only temporary attachment and ancillary directions. The classification between persons proceeded against under the penal provisions and those dealt with under section 18 was held to have a reasonable relation to the object of suppressing immoral traffic near public places.

Conclusion: Section 18 is not unconstitutional under Article 14.

Issue (ii): Whether, where the facts disclosed a cognizable offence under section 3, the Magistrate could proceed directly under section 18 without first taking action under the penal provision.

Analysis: On a harmonious construction of the Act, where the material before the Magistrate disclosed a cognizable offence under section 3, the Magistrate was bound first to proceed under the penal provision and could resort to section 18 only after disposal of those proceedings, if occasion still remained. The Magistrate had no discretion to ignore the cognizable offence and proceed only under section 18, and section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 required cognizance of such offence. The Magistrate could, if necessary, direct further investigation by a competent officer before deciding the proper course.

Conclusion: The Magistrate could not bypass section 3 and proceed straightaway under section 18 where the facts disclosed a cognizable offence.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the proceedings under section 18 had been initiated without first taking action under section 3, though the respondents remained liable to be proceeded against afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory classification is valid under Article 14 where it is founded on a real distinction having a rational relation to the legislative object, and where cognizable penal offences are disclosed, the Magistrate must first proceed under the penal provision before resorting to a preventive attachment provision.

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