Licensing discretion under police law upheld where statutory purpose supplied guidance and mala fides in refusal were not proved.

Section 39 of the Calcutta Police Act was upheld as a reasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade because the discretion of the licensing authority was read as confined by the statute's objects of securing good behaviour and preventing drunkenness and disorder, together with the implied requirement that the applicant be in actual control of the premises. The absence of an express hearing requirement or recorded reasons did not make the provision unreasonable in this licensing context, and the challenge based on mala fides also failed because no personal animus, collateral motive, or extraneous favouritism was shown. The dissent would have treated the discretion as uncanalised and procedurally unsafe.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 39 of the Calcutta Police Act, No. IV of 1866 imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade by conferring arbitrary and uncanalised discretion on the Commissioner of Police. (ii) Whether the order rejecting the licence application was vitiated by mala fides.

Issue (i): Whether section 39 of the Calcutta Police Act, No. IV of 1866 imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade by conferring arbitrary and uncanalised discretion on the Commissioner of Police.

Analysis: The section was read as a whole and treated as containing implied guidance for the licensing authority. The discretion was held to be controlled by the statutory objects of securing the good behaviour of the keeper and preventing drunkenness and disorder among patrons, together with the necessary implication that the applicant must be in actual and effective control of the premises. The absence of an express requirement of hearing or communicated reasons was held not to render the provision unreasonable in the setting of a police licensing measure administered as an administrative order.

Conclusion: Section 39 was upheld as a valid reasonable restriction and not unconstitutional.

Issue (ii): Whether the order rejecting the licence application was vitiated by mala fides.

Analysis: No personal animus, collateral motive, or extraneous favouritism was established. The challenge was reduced to a dispute over the correctness of the reasons recorded for refusal and an allegation of annoyance arising from prior litigation, which was insufficient to establish mala fides.

Conclusion: The allegation of mala fides failed.

Final Conclusion: The petition did not succeed, and the constitutional challenge to the licensing provision was rejected.

Concurring Opinion: The majority view sustained the licensing provision by treating its discretion as guided by statutory objectives and by holding that the procedural absence of a hearing or recorded reasons did not invalidate it.

Dissenting Opinion: Subba Rao, J. held that section 39 conferred an unrestrained discretion without adequate procedural safeguards, and that the provision infringed the fundamental right to carry on trade.

Ratio Decidendi: A pre-Constitution licensing provision will be upheld as a reasonable restriction if, on a fair construction, it supplies sufficient statutory guidance for the exercise of discretion and the surrounding administrative procedure is not, in the context of the statute, arbitrary or excessive.

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