Contingent refund rights are not estate property when no vested entitlement existed at death.

A refund dependent on pending appellate proceedings at the date of death was not treated as property passing on death for estate duty purposes. The right to refund arose only when the appellate orders were later passed, so no enforceable or vested entitlement existed on the date of death. A merely contingent or inchoate claim, which may or may not materialise, is not property capable of being included in the estate. On that basis, the refund was excluded from the estate and no referable question of law arose.

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Issues: Whether a refund arising from appellate orders passed after the deceased's death constituted property passing on death and was includible in the estate for estate duty purposes, and whether any referable question of law arose.

Analysis: The refund depended entirely on the outcome of pending appeals at the time of death. Since the appellate proceedings were still uncertain and the entitlement to refund arose only when the appellate orders were subsequently passed, there was no enforceable right or tangible property in existence on the date of death. A mere contingent or inchoate claim to refund, which may or may not materialise, does not amount to property within the meaning of the Estate Duty Act. The principle applied was that only property passing on death, and not a right arising later from a subsequent event, can be brought into the estate.

Conclusion: The refund was not property passing on the death of the deceased and was not liable to be included in the estate; no referable question of law arose.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund contingent upon the outcome of pending appellate proceedings does not constitute property passing on death unless a vested right to receive it existed at the time of death.

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