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Issues: Whether a general power of attorney, not conferring an express power to transfer immovable property by consent decree, authorised the attorney-holder to suffer such a decree on behalf of the principals.
Analysis: The authority created by a written power of attorney is to be construed strictly according to its terms and purpose. Each recital in the instrument constitutes a separate and distinct power, and a power not expressly conferred cannot be implied merely because the attorney may have authority to sell property or enter into a compromise. A decree based on admissions under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is distinct from a compromise decree under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the latter could not be validly obtained in the absence of specific authority to transfer the suit property by that mode.
Conclusion: The attorney-holder lacked the requisite authority to suffer the consent decree, and the decrees founded on such authority were rightly treated as illegal and void.
Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose in the second appeal, and the concurrent findings of the courts below were left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: A power of attorney must be strictly construed, and authority to act for the principal cannot be implied to include transfer of immovable property by consent decree unless such power is expressly conferred.