Retrospective penal liability under prison law rejected where alleged conduct was not prohibited when it occurred.

The alleged conduct did not attract Sections 42 or 45 of the Prisons Act, 1894 because the appellant was a visitor, not a prisoner, and the Punjab Jail Manual did not treat a mobile phone or charger as a prohibited article at the relevant time. Section 52-A, which later brought mobile phones and component parts within the penal field, was notified only in 2011 and could not be applied retrospectively to a 2009 . On that basis, the FIR did not disclose a prima facie offence and was liable to be quashed under the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process.

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Issues: (i) Whether the allegations disclosed an offence under Sections 42 and 45 of the Prisons Act, 1894, and whether the later introduction of Section 52-A could be applied to the occurrence; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to quash the FIR under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether the allegations disclosed an offence under Sections 42 and 45 of the Prisons Act, 1894, and whether the later introduction of Section 52-A could be applied to the occurrence.

Analysis: Section 45 applies to prison offences committed by a prisoner. The appellant was a visitor and not a prisoner when the alleged incident occurred, so Section 45 was inapplicable. Section 42 penalises introduction or communication only when it is contrary to rules made under Section 59. The Punjab Jail Manual's list of prohibited articles did not include a mobile phone or charger, so the alleged conduct was not contrary to the applicable prison rules. Section 52-A, which later brought mobile phones and component parts within the penal field, was notified in 2011, whereas the alleged offence was of 2009. A penal provision cannot be given retrospective effect in these circumstances.

Conclusion: No offence was made out under Sections 42 and 45 of the Prisons Act, 1894, and Section 52-A could not be applied to the appellant's case.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to quash the FIR under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The inherent power under Section 482 may be exercised to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. The case fell within the category where the FIR allegations, even if accepted at face value, did not prima facie constitute an offence. The materials did not disclose a legally sustainable prosecution because the alleged act was not prohibited at the relevant time and the appellant was not amenable to the prison-offence provision.

Conclusion: The refusal to quash the FIR was not justified.

Final Conclusion: The FIR and all consequential proceedings were set aside because the alleged conduct did not constitute an offence under the governing prison law at the relevant time.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution cannot be sustained where, on the date of the alleged occurrence, the conduct was not prohibited by the applicable prison rules and the statutory provision later creating liability had no retrospective operation; in such a case, the FIR is liable to be quashed under the High Court's inherent powers.

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