Binding compromise by authorised counsel upheld; consent decrees restored and later challenge to authority rejected.

A compromise recorded by the trial court on the Government Pleader's endorsement was binding on the State because counsel appearing for a party may consent to settlement where the record shows acceptance, and a later bare denial of authority cannot displace what was recorded without a contemporaneous objection before that court. The High Court should not have set aside the consent decrees or remanded the Section 34 petitions merely on an unsupported plea of lack of authority. The consent decrees were therefore restored and the State remained bound by the compromise.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Government Pleader's endorsement on the compromise memo was binding on the State and validly supported the consent order passed by the trial court; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the consent decrees and remanding the Section 34 petitions for decision on merits.

Issue (i): Whether the Government Pleader's endorsement on the compromise memo was binding on the State and validly supported the consent order passed by the trial court.

Analysis: The compromise was entered into during pending proceedings after negotiations initiated by the State itself. The memo filed by the contractor and the written endorsement made by the Government Pleader showed acceptance of the settlement as beneficial to the Government. A pleader duly authorised to appear for a party has authority under the Code of Civil Procedure to act on its behalf, including to consent to a compromise where the record shows such acceptance. The record of what transpired before the trial court could not be contradicted in appellate proceedings by a bare assertion that the advocate lacked authority, especially when no contemporaneous objection or recall application was made before the court that recorded the compromise.

Conclusion: The compromise and the resulting consent order were valid and binding on the State.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the consent decrees and remanding the Section 34 petitions for decision on merits.

Analysis: Once the compromise was validly recorded by the trial court, the High Court ought not to have interfered merely on the unsupported plea that the Government Pleader lacked authority. A consent decree passed on an agreed settlement binds the parties and operates against a later attempt to resile from it. The proper course, if the authority of counsel was genuinely disputed, was to approach the trial court that recorded the compromise. In the absence of any material showing lack of authority or impropriety, the High Court's interference was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in setting aside the consent decrees and remanding the matter.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the compromise decrees passed by the trial court were restored with costs.

Ratio Decidendi: A compromise recorded by a court on the endorsement of counsel appearing for a party is binding where counsel is duly authorised to act, and a concluded consent decree cannot be displaced in appeal on an unsupported belated plea that counsel lacked authority.

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