Limitation for setting aside a decree: Article 59 applies, knowledge is decisive, and derivative notice through a benamidar can bar the suit.

A suit to set aside a decree or instrument that obstructs a plaintiff's asserted title falls under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and limitation runs from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to seek setting aside first become known. Where title is claimed through a benamidar, the benamidar's knowledge of the earlier decrees and proceedings is imputed to the claimant. On the facts stated, the claimant could not displace the concurrent findings of knowledge, and Article 113 had no application. The suit was therefore barred as it was filed beyond three years from the date of knowledge.

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Issues: Whether the suit to set aside the preliminary and final decrees was governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or by the residuary Article 113, and whether the suit was barred by limitation on the footing that the petitioner had notice of the earlier proceedings through his benamidar.

Analysis: A suit seeking to avoid a decree or instrument that stands in the way of a plaintiff's asserted title falls within Article 59, and limitation runs from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside first became known. The petitioner claimed derivative title through his benamidar, and the benamidar had filed the earlier sale deed in the partition suit and was found to have knowledge of the preliminary and final decrees. The petitioner was therefore imputed with that knowledge, especially when he failed to produce the subsequent sale deed and could not displace the concurrent findings of fact. In these circumstances, Article 113 had no application.

Conclusion: The suit was governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond three years from the date of knowledge.

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