Vicarious liability of company directors requires proof they were in charge of business at the time of the offence.

Vicarious criminal liability for company directors under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 arises only if the complaint and evidence first show that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business when the offence was committed. That foundational requirement must be established before any burden shifts to the accused under the statutory proviso. In the absence of specific averments and supporting evidence, conviction cannot rest merely on the fact of directorship, and the prosecution against the directors was not sustainable.

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Issues: Whether the directors of a company could be convicted for offences under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 in the absence of specific averments and evidence that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the time of the offence.

Analysis: Section 49A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 creates vicarious liability only when the complainant first pleads and proves that the accused director was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business when the offence was committed. Only after that foundational requirement is satisfied does the burden shift to the accused to show lack of knowledge or due diligence. In the absence of such averments and supporting evidence, the statutory condition for fastening criminal liability on directors is not met, and conviction cannot be sustained merely because the accused held office as directors.

Conclusion: The directors could not be convicted on the material on record, and the dismissal of the prosecution against them was justified.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the prosecution did not establish the statutory basis for fastening criminal liability on the directors.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions imposing vicarious liability on directors, the complaint must contain and the evidence must establish that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time before the burden shifts under the statutory proviso.

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