2014 (10) TMI 947 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court dismisses petition challenging Chief Medical Officer appointment cancellations due to 27-year delay and laches doctrine

State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. Versus Arvind Kumar Srivastava & ors.

SC dismissed petition challenging cancellation of Chief Medical Officer appointments after 27-year delay. Respondents' appointments were cancelled in 1987 ... Doctrine of Delay and Laches - Appointment as Chief Medical Officer - selection process - cancellation of appointments challenged after 27 years - Held that:- The selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above. Issues Involved:1. Whether the respondents were entitled to the benefit of an earlier judgment despite not approaching the court in time.2. Whether the respondents' claim was barred by laches and delays.3. Whether the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India applied to the respondents' case.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Entitlement to the Benefit of Earlier Judgment:The respondents sought the same benefits as those granted to similarly situated persons in an earlier judgment by the Tribunal, which had become final. The Tribunal and the High Court extended these benefits to the respondents, reasoning that they were similarly situated and thus entitled to the same relief under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The appellants, however, contended that the respondents were 'fence-sitters' who did not approach the court in time and thus should not be granted the same relief.2. Laches and Delays:The respondents did not challenge the cancellation of their appointments until 1996, nine years after the cancellation orders were issued in 1987. The appellants argued that this delay amounted to acquiescence and that the respondents should not be allowed to benefit from the earlier judgment due to their inaction. The court examined various precedents where claims were denied on the grounds of laches and delays, emphasizing that those who do not challenge wrongful actions in time and acquiesce to the situation cannot later claim benefits extended to others who were diligent.3. Principle of Equality under Article 14:The respondents argued that denying them the same benefits as those granted to similarly situated persons would amount to invidious discrimination, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The court noted that while the normal rule is to treat similarly situated persons alike, this principle is subject to exceptions such as laches, delays, and acquiescence. The court differentiated between judgments in rem, which apply broadly to all similarly situated persons, and judgments in personam, which apply only to the parties before the court. In this case, the earlier judgment was in personam, and the respondents' delay in approaching the court disqualified them from claiming the same benefits.Conclusion:The court concluded that the respondents had accepted the cancellation of their appointments by not challenging the orders in time and only approached the court after seeing others succeed. Given the unexplained delay of nine years and the significant passage of time (27 years since the cancellation orders), the court found it unjust to grant the respondents the same benefits. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the High Court and the Tribunal were set aside. No costs were awarded.