Lease interpretation and expressio unius: non-residential letting of a house was not a breach absent an express use restriction.

A lease requiring construction of a house, but containing no express restriction to residential use, was construed as permitting non-residential letting. Applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court treated the omission of a use restriction as deliberate, especially where other appendices in the same rules expressly limited use or prohibited non-residential occupation. On that reading, letting out the first floor for non-residential purposes did not breach the lease deed, and forfeiture or re-entry on that ground was not sustainable. The Court did not decide separate arguments based on municipal or development-plan restrictions because the impugned action rested only on alleged breach of the lease.

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Issues: Whether letting out a house constructed on leased land for non-residential use amounted to a breach of the lease conditions so as to justify forfeiture and re-entry.

Analysis: The lease under the relevant appendix required construction of a house but did not impose any express restriction that the house must be used only for residential purposes. The Court compared the wording of other appendices under the same rules, where residential use was specifically mandated or non-residential use expressly prohibited, and held that the omission of any such restriction in the present clause was deliberate. Applying the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court held that a house, unless prohibited by the lease or statute, is not confined to residential use alone. The Court also declined to decide the separate contention based on municipal or development-plan restrictions because the impugned action was founded only on alleged breach of the lease deed.

Conclusion: The letting out of the first floor for non-residential purposes did not contravene the lease deed, and the notice of re-entry could not be sustained.

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