Vesting of acquired land requires possession, and executive orders cannot divest property rights without due process.

A declaration that land is required for public purpose does not by itself vest title in the State; vesting arises only when possession is actually taken under the acquisition process. On the facts described, the disputed land was never taken into possession under the 1942 proceedings, so it did not vest in the State. After the Constitution of Mewar came into force, a later executive order directing delivery of the land to another person could not divest existing rights without due process of law. The plaintiff was therefore treated as retaining protection over the property and was entitled to injunction and restoration of possession.

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Issues: (i) Whether the land in dispute had vested in the former State of Mewar by reason of the acquisition proceedings initiated in 1942. (ii) Whether the subsequent order directing delivery of the land to another person could defeat the plaintiff's rights after the Constitution of Mewar had come into force.

Issue (i): Whether the land in dispute had vested in the former State of Mewar by reason of the acquisition proceedings initiated in 1942.

Analysis: The order of the Ruler in 1942 was treated as no more than a declaration that the land was required for a public purpose. Applying the principle reflected in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Court held that vesting does not occur on a bare declaration of acquisition but only when possession is taken pursuant to the acquisition process. The record showed that possession of the disputed plot was never taken by the State under the 1942 proceedings, and at most only part of the larger area was acquired and taken over.

Conclusion: The disputed land did not vest in the State under the 1942 acquisition proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether the subsequent order directing delivery of the land to another person could defeat the plaintiff's rights after the Constitution of Mewar had come into force.

Analysis: By the time the later order was passed, Article XIII(1) of the Constitution of Mewar was in force and protected against deprivation of property otherwise than by due process of law. Since the disputed property had not vested in the State, the later executive order could not be treated as a mere consequence of the earlier acquisition. A bare administrative fiat was insufficient to divest the plaintiff of whatever rights he retained in the property.

Conclusion: The later order could not lawfully deprive the plaintiff of his rights in the property.

Final Conclusion: The plaintiff retained protection over the disputed property, was entitled to injunction and restoration of possession, and the decree of the courts below was set aside to that extent.

Ratio Decidendi: A declaration to acquire land does not by itself vest title in the State; vesting occurs only upon taking possession in the acquisition process, and once a constitutional guarantee of property and due process is in force, executive action cannot divest property rights without law.

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