Revenue court damages, trespass findings, and retrospective amendment limits in land reform litigation.

A revenue court hearing a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act may award damages where the substantive provision contemplates ejectment and damages, even if the original Schedule entry omitted express reference to damages. Concurrent factual findings that the defendants were trespassers and were not in possession with the plaintiff's consent are treated as findings of fact and are not ordinarily open to interference. A later procedural amendment making the State a necessary party was not applied so as to unsettle a decree already obtained and pending in appeal, and the absence of the State did not defeat the appeal or disturb the accrued position.

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Issues: (i) Whether a revenue court hearing a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act could grant damages though the original Schedule entry did not expressly mention them; (ii) whether the finding that the defendants were trespassers and not in possession with the plaintiff's consent could be interfered with; and (iii) whether, after the 1962 amendment making the State a necessary party to such suits, the absence of the State vitiated an appeal pending at the appellate stage.

Issue (i): Whether a revenue court hearing a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act could grant damages though the original Schedule entry did not expressly mention them.

Analysis: The statutory scheme showed that a suit under Section 209 was cognizable by the revenue court and the section itself contemplated relief by ejectment as well as damages. The omission of the words 'and damages' from the Schedule was treated as an omission in drafting, later supplied by amendment, and not as a limitation on the court's power to award damages where the substantive provision already permitted that relief.

Conclusion: The revenue court could validly grant damages, and the decree on that aspect was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the finding that the defendants were trespassers and not in possession with the plaintiff's consent could be interfered with.

Analysis: The question whether possession was with or without consent was treated as one of fact. The courts below had assessed the evidence and recorded a concurrent finding that the defendants were in possession without the plaintiff's consent and had trespassed upon the land.

Conclusion: The finding of trespass and absence of consent was not open to interference.

Issue (iii): Whether, after the 1962 amendment making the State a necessary party to such suits, the absence of the State vitiated an appeal pending at the appellate stage.

Analysis: Procedural amendments are ordinarily retrospective, but not where their application would unsettle rights already established by a valid decree or disturb a matter that has reached a later stage. A distinction was drawn between a suit at the trial stage and a matter already in appeal. Since the decree had already been obtained and the case was in appeal when the amendment came into force, the amendment was not applied so as to require impleadment of the State and defeat the successful party's accrued position.

Conclusion: The absence of the State did not render the appeal incompetent or justify setting aside the decree.

Final Conclusion: The appeal raised no ground sufficient to disturb the concurrent decree, and the dismissal with costs left the respondent's relief intact.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural amendment will not be applied retrospectively so as to unsettle a valid decree or impair rights already accrued, and a revenue court competent to entertain a suit under Section 209 may award all reliefs that the substantive provision contemplates, including damages.

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