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Issues: (i) Whether Rule 268 of the Madras Vehicles Rules, 1940 and the order shifting the bus stand were within the rule-making and regulatory power conferred by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and were not inconsistent with the municipal law. (ii) Whether the impugned restriction on the use of the bus stand violated Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as an unreasonable restriction. (iii) Whether the order was invalid for want of proper consultation or for mala fides or bias.
Issue (i): Whether Rule 268 of the Madras Vehicles Rules, 1940 and the order shifting the bus stand were within the rule-making and regulatory power conferred by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and were not inconsistent with the municipal law.
Analysis: The power in Section 68(1) to make rules for carrying into effect Chapter IV, read with Section 68(2)(r), was treated as wide enough to regulate where stage carriages may pick up or set down passengers, including notification of stands and alteration of existing places. The provision was read as covering both the prohibition of use at specified places and the exclusion of places other than duly notified stands or halting places. The municipal provisions did not displace this regulatory power, because the transport authority was acting under the Act and the rules made under it, which formed part of the statutory scheme.
Conclusion: Rule 268 and the resulting order were held to be intra vires and valid.
Issue (ii): Whether the impugned restriction on the use of the bus stand violated Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as an unreasonable restriction.
Analysis: The restriction did not prohibit the appellant from carrying on the business of a bus stand altogether, but only restricted the use of the particular stand for outward journeys in the interest of public convenience. A citizen has no fundamental right to carry on business at any place of choice, and a restriction imposed by the competent authority for public convenience was held not to be unreasonable merely because it reduced the appellant's earnings or displaced the earlier use of the stand.
Conclusion: No infringement of Article 19(1)(g) was established.
Issue (iii): Whether the order was invalid for want of proper consultation or for mala fides or bias.
Analysis: The record showed consultation with the Municipality, which satisfied the requirement of Rule 268. The choice of the Municipality as the consulted authority did not vitiate the action, as consultation was discretionary and the authority was not bound to consult any other body. The allegation of mala fides was unsupported by material, and the District Collector's participation did not affect validity because he was acting in an executive, not judicial, capacity.
Conclusion: The challenge based on consultation, mala fides, and bias failed.
Final Conclusion: The regulatory power to shift the stand in the interest of public convenience was upheld, the constitutional challenge failed, and the appellant was not entitled to relief.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory rule framed under a plenary power to control transport vehicles may validly regulate or shift bus stands and impose reasonable restrictions on their use in the interest of public convenience, provided the competent authority acts within the statutory scheme and with the required consultation.