Vacancy intimation under land requisition law held directory, but writ relief was refused on equitable grounds.

Section 6(2) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act was treated as prescribing a directory mode and time for vacancy intimation, because the scheme distinguished the substantive intimation from its procedural service requirement and the penal provision attached consequences to delay rather than to registered-post service itself. A later valid intimation could therefore still support action under Section 6(3), and the requisition was not upheld on that objection. The Court nevertheless refused writ relief in the exercise of discretion, noting the petitioner's inconsistent stands and the equities arising from the existing occupation of the premises, so the requisition order remained undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the requirement under Section 6(2) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 that vacancy intimation be given by registered post and within the prescribed time was mandatory or merely directory, and whether a subsequent intimation could validly be acted upon under Section 6(3); (ii) Whether discretionary writ relief ought to be refused on the ground that the petitioner's conduct and surrounding circumstances showed that justice was not on his side.

Issue (i): Whether the requirement under Section 6(2) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 that vacancy intimation be given by registered post and within the prescribed time was mandatory or merely directory, and whether a subsequent intimation could validly be acted upon under Section 6(3).

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguishes between the substance of the intimation under Section 6(1) and the mode and time of giving it under Section 6(2). The penal provision in Section 6(5) specifically attaches punishment to failure to give intimation within the prescribed period, but does not treat the registered-post requirement as the source of the substantive right. On that construction, the registered-post requirement is procedural and directory, not mandatory in the sense urged by the State. A landlord who gives the requisite intimation, even if not in strict compliance with the mode prescribed in Section 6(2), is not permanently disabled from relying on a later valid intimation; after the expiry of one month from receipt of such intimation, occupation becomes authorised and the vacancy ceases for the purpose of requisition.

Conclusion: The requirement of registered-post service under Section 6(2) was directory, and a valid intimation could be acted upon for the purposes of Section 6(3); the requisition was not sustained on this statutory objection.

Issue (ii): Whether discretionary writ relief ought to be refused on the ground that the petitioner's conduct and surrounding circumstances showed that justice was not on his side.

Analysis: Relief under writ jurisdiction is discretionary and depends not only on legal invalidity but also on the applicant's fairness and entitlement to equitable relief. The record showed that the premises were in the occupation of another person when the petition was prosecuted, while the petitioner had taken inconsistent stands regarding the vacancy and the later occupation of the premises. In those circumstances, setting aside the requisition would have displaced a Government occupant and restored possession to a party who was not himself shown to be in actual need or occupation of the premises. The Court therefore treated the matter as one where equity and justice did not favour interference.

Conclusion: Discretionary relief was refused, and the writ petition was not allowed despite the statutory challenge to the requisition order.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the Court declined to grant writ relief in the petitioner's favour, with the result that the requisition order was left undisturbed and the petition stood dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory intimation requirement is substantially complied with, the prescribed mode of service may be directory if the scheme and penal provisions show that the legislature treated the mode as procedural; however, writ relief may still be refused where the applicant's conduct and the equities of the case do not justify intervention.

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