Mandatory academic qualification and unequal interview opportunity invalidated part of the selection, while qualified appointments survived.

A statutory qualification for Readership under Ordinance 9 requiring a first class or high second class master's degree was held mandatory, because the ordinance treated it as the minimum academic standard and allowed relaxation only where expressly provided. "High second class" was construed to mean marks in the upper half of the second class range, near the first class bracket, not the lower end. The selection process was not invalid merely because interviews were used, but granting one candidate a second opportunity while denying a similarly placed candidate the same chance was discriminatory under Article 14. Appointments of unqualified candidates were invalid, while the appointments of qualified candidates were upheld.

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Issues: (i) whether the prescription in Ordinance 9 requiring a first class or a high second class master's degree for Readership was mandatory; (ii) whether the expression "high second class" could include marks at the lower end of the second class range; (iii) whether the selection process and the differential opportunity given to candidates vitiated the appointments under Article 14.

Issue (i): whether the prescription in Ordinance 9 requiring a first class or a high second class master's degree for Readership was mandatory.

Analysis: The qualification was treated as the minimum standard for the post and not as a merely directory norm. The ordinance itself provided express relaxation in specified situations, which showed that where no relaxation was stated the requirement was intended to operate compulsorily. A Reader was viewed as a senior academic post requiring demonstrable academic excellence.

Conclusion: The requirement of a first class or high second class master's degree was mandatory.

Issue (ii): whether the expression "high second class" could include marks at the lower end of the second class range.

Analysis: The expression was construed according to its ordinary and purposive meaning. "High" was held to denote the superior half of the second class range, near the first class bracket, and not the minimum marks needed to pass into second class. Marks around the lower half of the second class range could not satisfy the prescribed standard, and the adjective "high" could not be rendered redundant.

Conclusion: Only candidates securing marks above the mid-point of the second class range could be treated as having a high second class.

Issue (iii): whether the selection process and the differential opportunity given to candidates vitiated the appointments under Article 14.

Analysis: The use of interviews by the selection committee was not illegal in itself, and academic bodies could devise fair procedures subject to reasonableness and natural justice. However, the benefit of a second opportunity to appear was extended to one candidate and denied to another similarly placed candidate without a lawful basis. That unequal treatment between equals amounted to discrimination. The resulting appointments of candidates who did not satisfy the mandatory qualification were also inconsistent with the statutory ordinance.

Conclusion: The selections and appointments of respondents 5, 6, 8 and 9 were invalid, while the selections and appointments of respondents 7 and 10 were upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded substantially, the impugned appellate judgment was reversed to the extent necessary, and a fresh selection was directed from among qualified candidates while preserving the appointments of respondents 7 and 10.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory qualification for an academic post is expressed in mandatory terms, the court may enforce it on its true meaning, and unequal procedural treatment of similarly situated candidates invalidates the selection under Article 14.

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