1976 (8) TMI 164 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court rules licensee not tenant, revokes license. High Court judgment set aside, respondent to vacate.

D.H. MANIAR & ORS. Versus WAMAN LAXMAN KUDAV

The Supreme Court determined that the respondent was a licensee, not a tenant, and that the license had been revoked by efflux of time. The respondent ... - Issues Involved:1. Whether the respondent was a tenant or a licensee.2. Whether the respondent was entitled to protection under the Bombay Rent Act as amended by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973.3. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Small Cause Court's order.Summary:1. Tenant or Licensee:The appellants filed an application u/s 41 of The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, to compel the respondent to vacate the premises. The Small Cause Court ruled in favor of the appellants u/s 43 of the S.C.C. Act, determining that the respondent was a licensee, not a tenant. The Bombay High Court, however, set aside this decision, leading to the present appeal. The Supreme Court emphasized that the respondent was a mere licensee as defined u/s 52 of The Indian Easements Act, 1882, and the license had been revoked by efflux of time u/s 62(c) of the Easements Act.2. Protection under the Bombay Rent Act:The respondent claimed protection under the amended Bombay Rent Act, specifically sections 5(4A) and 15A introduced by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973. The Small Cause Court found no subsisting agreement for a license on February 1, 1973, thus denying the respondent protection. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, stating that to benefit from section 15A, the respondent must have been a licensee under a subsisting agreement on February 1, 1973. Since the license had ended on March 31, 1966, the respondent could not be considered a licensee under a subsisting agreement and thus could not claim protection.3. High Court's Errors:The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for gross errors in law and fact. The High Court erroneously presumed that the appellants' failure to take immediate action implied a fresh license. The Supreme Court clarified that the filing of an application u/s 41 of the S.C.C. Act does not imply the grant of a new license. The High Court's interpretation that the appellants' conduct amounted to a fresh license was deemed incorrect. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's judgment was fundamentally flawed and restored the order of the Small Cause Court, directing the respondent to vacate the premises.Conclusion:The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the order of the Small Cause Court was restored. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs to the appellants in both the Supreme Court and the High Court.