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Issues: Whether the High Court could quash a police investigation into a cognizable offence at the stage when only the first information report had been recorded and investigation had commenced.
Analysis: The statutory scheme in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers on the police a right to investigate cognizable offences under sections 154 and 156 without prior authorisation from a Magistrate. That power cannot be curtailed by resort to section 439 or the inherent power preserved by section 561A, because the functions of the police and the judiciary are complementary and the court ordinarily intervenes only after a charge is brought before it. On that principle, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interdict the investigation merely because the offence was alleged to be triable under the Special Courts legislation.
Conclusion: The High Court erred in quashing the investigation, and the police investigation was rightly allowed to continue in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A court cannot, by invoking revisional or inherent powers, prevent or quash a lawful police investigation into a cognizable offence before the stage of judicial cognizance or charge, because the statutory power of investigation belongs to the police and is not subject to prior judicial control save in exceptional cases expressly recognised by law.