1960 (2) TMI 59 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court upholds Vindhya Pradesh Land Reforms Act 1952, except for specific provisions

State Of Vindhya Pradesh Brijinder Singh Versus Moradhwaj Singh State Of Vndhya Pradesh

State Of Vindhya Pradesh Brijinder Singh Versus Moradhwaj Singh State Of Vndhya Pradesh - 1960 AIR 796, 1960 (3) SCR 106 Issues Involved:1. Constitutionality of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952.2. Validity of Section 22(1) of the Act.3. Validity of Section 37 of the Act.4. Validity of Clause (4)(e) of the Schedule to the Act.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Constitutionality of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952:The petitioners argued that the Act was unconstitutional as it imposed unreasonable restrictions on their fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. The Judicial Commissioner upheld the constitutionality of the Act except for three provisions: Section 22(1), Section 37, and Clause (4)(e) of the Schedule. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal challenging the constitutionality of the Act as a whole, citing Article 31-A of the Constitution and previous judgments in similar cases (e.g., The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh, Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh). The Court concluded that it was unnecessary to examine the Act's provisions in detail.2. Validity of Section 22(1) of the Act:Section 22(1) provides that a jagirdar shall be allotted all sir and khudkasht lands he was cultivating personally for three years immediately preceding the date of resumption. The Judicial Commissioner deemed this a 'colourable piece of legislation,' arguing it discriminated against jagirdars compared to other land occupants under Section 28(1). The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that jagirdars and other occupants belong to different classes, and even if discrimination existed, Article 31-A protects such legislation from being struck down on this ground. The Court emphasized that the Vindhya Pradesh legislature had full competence to enact this provision under Entry 18, List II of the Seventh Schedule, and it was not a colourable legislation.3. Validity of Section 37 of the Act:Section 37(1) bars civil courts from settling, deciding, or dealing with any question under the Act, while Section 37(2) prevents orders by specified authorities from being questioned in any court. The Judicial Commissioner found this section invalid, claiming it was repugnant to Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which grants civil courts jurisdiction over all suits of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred. The Supreme Court clarified that Section 9 acknowledges that competent legislation can bar civil court jurisdiction, and Section 37 was such a provision. Therefore, there was no repugnancy, and the legislature had the power to enact Section 37, making it valid.4. Validity of Clause (4)(e) of the Schedule to the Act:Clause (4)(e) of the Schedule involves deductions for sir and khudkasht lands remaining with the jagirdar, considering their rent valuation minus land revenue. The Judicial Commissioner argued this deprived jagirdars of proprietary interest without compensation. The Supreme Court noted that while jagirdars might pay rent in the future, they are relieved of paying land revenue, which is factored into the net assets calculation. The Court concluded that this provision was not unconstitutional, as it fairly accounted for the land remaining with the jagirdar.Conclusion:The Supreme Court dismissed Appeal No. 110, affirming the constitutionality of the Act except for the challenged provisions. It allowed Appeals Nos. 40 to 109, upholding the validity and constitutionality of Section 22(1), Section 37, and Clause (4)(e) of the Schedule. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.