Non-use of controlled goods alone does not breach permit conditions absent clear prohibition on storage or delayed utilisation.

Mere non-use or temporary retention of iron and steel obtained under a permit did not, by itself, amount to a breach of clause 7 of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, 1956, because the prohibition on "use" was read in context and did not create a time-limit for actual consumption or bar storage pending construction. The application for the permit could be used to construe the permit condition as to purpose, but the materials on record only showed intended use for a temple, and in one case a temple and dharamshala, without proving any locality-specific restriction. On that basis, no contravention was established and the acquittal was upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether mere non-use or non-utilisation of iron and steel acquired under the permit amounted to a contravention of clause 7 of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, 1956; (ii) Whether the application for the permit could be referred to for construing the condition in the permit as to the purpose of acquisition and utilisation.

Issue (i): Whether mere non-use or non-utilisation of iron and steel acquired under the permit amounted to a contravention of clause 7 of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, 1956.

Analysis: Clause 7 prohibited use of iron and steel otherwise than in accordance with the conditions contained or incorporated in the document authorising acquisition. The expression "use" had to be read in its context. The Order did not prescribe any time-limit for utilisation, nor did it indicate that keeping or storing the material pending actual construction was itself prohibited. The wording suggested positive misuse or diversion, not mere failure to consume the goods within a particular time or at a particular stage. A mere non-user, without more, was not enough to establish breach.

Conclusion: Mere non-use or unutilised retention did not amount to contravention of clause 7.

Issue (ii): Whether the application for the permit could be referred to for construing the condition in the permit as to the purpose of acquisition and utilisation.

Analysis: The permit condition referred to use of the materials for the purpose for which they were asked for and granted. That language allowed reference to the application to identify the purpose of acquisition. Even on such reference, however, the applications disclosed only construction of a temple, and in one case a temple and dharamshala, without establishing any binding limitation that the construction had to be at a particular place. The record did not justify reading into the condition a locality-specific restriction.

Conclusion: The application could be referred to for construing the permit condition, but it did not establish any contravention on the facts found.

Final Conclusion: The Court upheld the acquittal and held that no breach of clause 7 of the Control Order was proved.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory prohibition on "use" of goods in accordance with permit conditions does not extend to mere non-use unless the language or scheme of the instrument clearly prohibits keeping or storing the goods pending utilisation.

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