Limitation Act does not extend a special tax remedy where the statute excludes condonation; rectification was valid.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not extend the one-month period prescribed in section 19 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act for reopening an assessment, because the statute is a self-contained code and confers no power to condone delay under that provision. A belated section 19 application was therefore not maintainable. Section 36 permits rectification within three years to correct a mistake apparent from the record, and the Tribunal validly used that power to correct its earlier order after recognising that delay under section 19 could not be condoned. The challenge to the rectification failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an application under section 19 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 so as to permit condonation of delay. (ii) Whether the rectification made under section 36 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 was valid.

Issue (i): Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an application under section 19 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 so as to permit condonation of delay.

Analysis: Section 19 prescribes a one-month period from service of the notice of demand for reopening the assessment. The Act separately confers express powers to condone delay in appeal under sections 31(3) and 32(3), but no such power is provided to the Agricultural Income-tax Officer under section 19. The statute therefore operates as a self-contained code for this remedy, and the general provision in section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot extend the time prescribed for filing an application under section 19.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply, and a delayed application under section 19 cannot be entertained.

Issue (ii): Whether the rectification made under section 36 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 was valid.

Analysis: Section 36 authorises rectification within three years of the assessment or appellate order to correct a mistake apparent from the record. The Tribunal initially proceeded on an incorrect view that delay under section 19 could be condoned. On recognising the correct legal position, it exercised its rectification power within the statutory period to correct that error.

Conclusion: The rectification under section 36 was valid.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the rectification order failed because the belated section 19 application was not maintainable and the Tribunal was entitled to correct its earlier order under the rectification provision.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a fiscal statute prescribes a specific limitation period for a remedy and does not confer power to condone delay, the general limitation provision cannot be invoked to enlarge that period; an order based on an erroneous contrary view may be rectified within the statutory rectification period.

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