Declaratory relief and lis pendens: a pendente lite lease and attachment were held ineffective against existing property rights.

Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 was treated as non-exhaustive, so a declaratory suit may lie where the claimant shows sufficient legal interest. A mortgagee decree-holder and assignee whose executable interest could be prejudiced by a later lease had standing to seek a declaration, and the relief was maintainable. A lease created during pending litigation was held void against the plaintiff under the doctrine of lis pendens in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act because it created new rights pendente lite; Section 65A(2)(e) did not displace that doctrine. The lease was also invalid under Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code because the property stood under attachment when executed.

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Issues: (i) Whether a declaratory suit was maintainable outside the scope of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and whether the plaintiff had sufficient legal interest to seek the declaration. (ii) Whether the lease executed during pending litigation was void under the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, and whether Section 65A(2)(e) displaced that doctrine. (iii) Whether the lease was invalid under Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code in view of the subsisting attachment at the time of execution.

Issue (i): Whether a declaratory suit was maintainable outside the scope of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and whether the plaintiff had sufficient legal interest to seek the declaration.

Analysis: Section 42 was held to be not exhaustive of all declaratory reliefs. It merely recognises a well-settled class of declarations and imposes a limitation on the grant of merely declaratory decrees. The plaintiff was not a stranger to the property: he stood as a mortgagee decree-holder and also as assignee of a decree-holder whose property had already been attached. The alleged lease could affect the value and executable character of the property. In those circumstances, the plaintiff had a sufficient legal interest to seek a declaration.

Conclusion: The declaratory suit was maintainable and the declaration was properly sought in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue (ii): Whether the lease executed during pending litigation was void under the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, and whether Section 65A(2)(e) displaced that doctrine.

Analysis: The lease of 1956 was not treated as a mere enforcement of an antecedent right. It purported to create new rights while litigation concerning the property was pending. Such a transfer attracted the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52. The argument based on Section 65A(2)(e) was rejected because the special doctrine of lis pendens governed transfers creating rights pendente lite, and the impugned lease was invalid from the outset.

Conclusion: The lease was void against the pending litigation and ineffective under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Issue (iii): Whether the lease was invalid under Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code in view of the subsisting attachment at the time of execution.

Analysis: The concurrent findings that the property stood attached in execution when the lease was executed were accepted. On that footing, the lease fell within the prohibition in Section 64. The provision was treated as an application of the same policy underlying lis pendens in the circumstances of attachment and pending execution.

Conclusion: The lease was also invalid under Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the declaratory relief failed, and the impugned lease was held ineffective against the plaintiff's rights because it was created pendente lite and during subsisting attachment.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 does not exhaust the field of declaratory relief, and a transfer creating new rights in property during pending litigation is invalid against persons whose existing legal interests would be prejudiced by it.

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