Registered lease deeds relate back to execution, while permissive possession cannot become adverse without clear hostile proof.

A registered lease deed takes effect from the date of its execution under Section 47 of the Registration Act, so later registration does not defeat rights already created before a vesting date under an abolition statute. Possession that began permissively as a licensee for a brick-kiln does not mature into adverse possession without clear proof of hostile animus and possession to the true owner's knowledge; mere long possession is insufficient. The commentary also notes that such factual findings are not ordinarily reopened in second appeal or under Article 136.

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Issues: (i) Whether a lease deed executed before vesting but registered thereafter could operate from the date of execution so as to defeat the claim of vesting in the State under the relevant abolition statute; and (ii) whether possession initially taken as a licensee for a brick-kiln could mature into adverse possession.

Issue (i): Whether a lease deed executed before vesting but registered thereafter could operate from the date of execution so as to defeat the claim of vesting in the State under the relevant abolition statute.

Analysis: Section 47 of the Registration Act embodies the rule that a registered document operates from the time it would have commenced to operate if registration had not been required, and not merely from the date of registration. Once registered, the document takes effect from the date of its execution. On the facts, the lease deed was executed before the material vesting date and therefore could not be treated as ineffective merely because registration was completed later.

Conclusion: The title derived under the lease deed was upheld and the plea that the land had vested in the State failed.

Issue (ii): Whether possession initially taken as a licensee for a brick-kiln could mature into adverse possession.

Analysis: Possession that begins permissively does not become adverse unless there is cogent and convincing evidence of hostile animus and possession to the knowledge of the true owner. Mere long possession is insufficient. The factual finding recorded below was that the appellant entered under a licence and failed to establish the necessary hostile possession. In second appeal, and certainly in proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, there was no basis to reappreciate the evidence so as to disturb that finding.

Conclusion: The plea of adverse possession was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appellant failed on both title and adverse possession, and the decree in favour of the respondent was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A registered document operates from the date of its execution under Section 47 of the Registration Act, and permissive possession cannot become adverse without clear proof of hostile possession adverse to the knowledge of the true owner.

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