Mandatory Section 5A hearing and Part VII safeguards govern acquisition for a cooperative housing society; writ relief must be individualized.

Compliance with Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act was mandatory, because the objection process conferred a valuable quasi-judicial right to be heard before acquisition and the defects in notice, hearing, and consideration of material vitiated the enquiry. Acquisition for a cooperative housing society attracted Part VII safeguards, since a cooperative society fell within the statutory definition of "company"; the conditions in Section 40, Rule 4, and the related government-consent and agreement requirements therefore had to be satisfied. The High Court was also required to grant individualized relief under Article 226 and should not have set aside the Section 6 declaration wholesale where petitioners had different factual positions and equities.

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Issues: (i) whether compliance with the objection procedure under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act was mandatory and whether the enquiry held thereunder was vitiated; (ii) whether acquisition of land for a cooperative housing society attracted Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, including Section 40 and Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963, and whether the society could be treated as a company for that purpose; and (iii) whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in wholesale terms instead of granting individualized relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): whether compliance with the objection procedure under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act was mandatory and whether the enquiry held thereunder was vitiated.

Analysis: The statutory scheme required publication and personal service of the Section 4 notification, followed by a written objection, a hearing before the Collector, and further enquiry before a final report could be made to the Government. The objection proceeding was treated as a blend of public and individual enquiry, and the Collector's function at that stage was quasi-judicial. The provision embodied a valuable right in the person interested to oppose acquisition, and once Section 5A was available, it could not be treated casually. On the facts, the record disclosed defects in notice, hearing, opportunity to adduce material, and consideration of inspection material.

Conclusion: The requirement of Section 5A was mandatory, and the High Court was right in holding that the enquiry was vitiated.

Issue (ii): whether acquisition of land for a cooperative housing society attracted Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, including Section 40 and Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963, and whether the society could be treated as a company for that purpose.

Analysis: Under the Act, a cooperative society fell within the inclusive definition of company. Acquisition for a company could proceed only after the conditions precedent in Part VII were satisfied, including previous Government consent, an enquiry under Section 40 or reliance on the Section 5A report, execution of the agreement under Section 41, and compliance with Rule 4. Rule 4 required the Government to be satisfied, through the Collector's enquiry and report, that the company had made reasonable efforts to secure land by negotiation, that the land was suitable and not excessive, and that no alternative site was available for good agricultural land. The society was neither a private company nor a Government company, but it still remained a company within the statutory definition and therefore had to satisfy the Part VII safeguards before invoking the acquisition machinery.

Conclusion: Acquisition for the society was subject to Section 40 and Rule 4, and the society could not escape the statutory requirements applicable to a company.

Issue (iii): whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in wholesale terms instead of granting individualized relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The Court accepted that illegalities in the acquisition process were open to scrutiny, but held that the High Court should not have annulled the declaration across the board. The matters involved multiple writ petitioners with differing factual situations, equities, possession claims, and delay factors. The proper course was to confine relief to the individual petitioners who had approached the High Court and to examine each case separately, rather than extinguishing the acquisition in its entirety. The exercise of writ discretion required individualized attention and a calibrated equitable approach.

Conclusion: The High Court erred in granting a wholesale remand and in setting aside the declaration for all lands without individualized consideration.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the High Court's common orders were set aside, and the matters were remitted for fresh, case-specific consideration with relief, if any, to be determined separately for each writ petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: Where land acquisition proceedings involve multiple petitioners with distinct factual positions, the writ court must apply individualized scrutiny and cannot nullify the acquisition uniformly without considering each case on its own equities, while compliance with Section 5A and Part VII safeguards remains mandatory where acquisition is for a company.

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