Revisional interference after acquittal is limited to manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice, not mere reappraisal of evidence.

The Court explained that liaison arrangements through a maritime board, where seamen presented themselves but were selected by shipowners or their captains, did not amount to the "supply" of seamen under section 25 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act. It further held that collecting Re. 1 as a contribution toward office expenses, rather than as payment for procuring employment, did not constitute remuneration for providing employment under section 26. On revisional interference, the Court stated that revision after acquittal is confined to exceptional cases of manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice, and is not meant to reappreciate evidence. The retrial direction was therefore improper.

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Issues: (i) Whether the issue of muster cards and the arrangement through the Calcutta Maritime Board amounted to the "supply" of seamen within section 25 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act; (ii) Whether the collection of Re. 1 from the seaman constituted demand or receipt of remuneration for providing employment within section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act; (iii) Whether the High Court was justified in exercising revisional jurisdiction to direct a retrial after acquittal.

Issue (i): Whether the issue of muster cards and the arrangement through the Calcutta Maritime Board amounted to the "supply" of seamen within section 25 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act.

Analysis: The arrangement did not amount to supply of seamen. The Board and the associated office were only liaison or regulating bodies bringing owners and seamen together. Seamen presented themselves for engagement, but they were selected and engaged by the shipowners or their captains. There was no obligation on the owners to take any particular seaman, and no engagement or supply was made by the Board or its officers.

Conclusion: The accused did not contravene section 25, and the finding was in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the collection of Re. 1 from the seaman constituted demand or receipt of remuneration for providing employment within section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act.

Analysis: The amount of Re. 1 was not remuneration for providing employment. The accused was a salaried secretary drawing pay from the shipowners' conference, while the Re. 1 collected from the seamen was treated as a contribution towards the expenses of the office and not as payment to the accused. The prosecution also failed to prove the alleged receipt of Re. 1 from the complainant before registration.

Conclusion: The accused did not contravene section 26, and the finding was in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the High Court was justified in exercising revisional jurisdiction to direct a retrial after acquittal.

Analysis: Revisional power under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was to be used only in exceptional cases involving manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice. It was not meant to correct mere errors of law or appreciation of evidence, especially where the lower court's acquittal was supported by the record. The interference here was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in directing a retrial, and the revisional order was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The acquittal was restored and the prosecution case under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act failed, while the revisional interference by the High Court was held improper.

Ratio Decidendi: Revisional jurisdiction should not be used to overturn an acquittal unless there is manifest illegality or a gross miscarriage of justice, and liability under the shipping provisions requires actual supply of seamen or receipt of remuneration for providing employment.

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