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Issues: (i) Whether the third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 barred the landlords' second eviction petition after an earlier compromise arrangement. (ii) Whether the first and second provisos to Section 14(3)(a)(i) disentitled the landlords from seeking eviction on the ground of personal requirement. (iii) Whether the landlords had established bona fide requirement for their own occupation within Section 14(3)(a)(i).
Issue (i): Whether the third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 barred the landlords' second eviction petition after an earlier compromise arrangement.
Analysis: The third proviso applies where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under an eviction order and then seeks possession again of another building of the same class. Here, there was no eviction order in the earlier round because the parties compromised, and the tenant merely shifted from one part of the same building to another. A settlement-driven rearrangement of accommodation without judicial eviction did not amount to the landlord having obtained possession after the tenant vacated the building.
Conclusion: The third proviso did not apply and did not bar the eviction petition.
Issue (ii): Whether the first and second provisos to Section 14(3)(a)(i) disentitled the landlords from seeking eviction on the ground of personal requirement.
Analysis: The first proviso is attracted only when the landlord is occupying another residential building owned by him in the same urban area and that building is reasonably sufficient to meet the proven requirement. The accommodation already in the landlords' occupation was fully occupied by one brother and his family and could not realistically satisfy the other brother's separate residential need. The second proviso also failed because the record did not establish that the landlords had vacated any residential building within five years without sufficient cause. The compromise arrangement and the changed family circumstances furnished sufficient cause.
Conclusion: The first and second provisos did not defeat the landlords' claim.
Issue (iii): Whether the landlords had established bona fide requirement for their own occupation within Section 14(3)(a)(i).
Analysis: The expression "his own occupation" was construed liberally to include the residential needs of the landlord's family members. The evidence showed paucity of accommodation, a separate need arising from enlarged family circumstances, and the absence of any mala fide motive. The requirement was real, subsisting, and not a device to evict an inconvenient tenant. The provision had to be read pragmatically so as to advance justice and not to impose an unrealistically rigid restriction on the landlord's right.
Conclusion: The landlords had proved bona fide requirement for their own occupation.
Final Conclusion: The eviction decree was restored because none of the provisos barred relief and the landlords' need for the premises was established as genuine and continuing.
Ratio Decidendi: A landlord's subsequent bona fide residential requirement is not barred by the third proviso where there was no prior eviction order and no vacation of the building by the tenant, and the words "his own occupation" must be construed liberally to include the genuine residential needs of the landlord's family.