Binding higher-order refund entitlement prevents reopening of concluded duty demand and supports interest for delay.

Refund of duty deposited under protest could not be refused once the revisional authority had finally set aside the underlying demand and that order had attained finality. The refunding authority could not reopen the same under-valuation issue to retain the amount, and the existence of an alternative remedy did not justify ignoring the binding superior order. The delayed refund also justified monetary relief: simple interest was directed from three months after the refund application, together with costs, because the claim had already accrued and further litigation had been wrongly compelled.

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Issues: (i) whether the refund of duty deposited under protest could be withheld after the revisional authority had set aside the duty demand, and (ii) whether the petitioners were entitled to interest and costs for the delayed refund.

Issue (i): whether the refund of duty deposited under protest could be withheld after the revisional authority had set aside the duty demand.

Analysis: The revisional authority had already quashed the demand based on the alleged under-valuation, and that order had attained finality. Once the higher authority had finally decided the dispute in favour of the petitioners, the same ground could not be re-agitated by the refunding authority to deny restitution. The refund amount had been deposited under protest, and no rule was shown to justify its continued retention after the demand itself had been annulled. The objection that an alternative remedy existed was rejected because the impugned refusal ignored a binding superior order.

Conclusion: The refusal to grant refund was illegal, and the petitioners were entitled to refund in full.

Issue (ii): whether the petitioners were entitled to interest and costs for the delayed refund.

Analysis: The refund application had remained pending for an unreasonable period, and the authority wrongfully forced further litigation by denying a claim that had already accrued after the revisional order. In these circumstances, simple interest was directed from three months after the refund application, along with costs.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to simple interest at 9% per annum from three months after the refund application and to costs.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed, refund was directed with interest, and the petition was allowed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi: A lower authority cannot refuse refund by reopening an issue already finally decided by a binding higher order, and delay in granting a legally due refund can justify an award of interest and costs.

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