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of <h1>Court reinstates petitioners, deems termination arbitrary. Probation period rule upheld.</h1> <h3>AJIT SINGH Versus STATE OF PUNJAB</h3> AJIT SINGH Versus STATE OF PUNJAB - 1983 AIR 494, 1983 (2) SCR 517, 1983 (2) SCC 217, 1983 (1) SCALE 262 Issues Involved:1. Validity of the orders dispensing with the petitioners' services.2. Period of probation for the petitioners.3. Arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the termination orders.4. Dissolution of the Improvement Trusts as a pretext for termination.5. Right to reinstatement and compensation.Detailed Analysis:1. Validity of the Orders Dispensing with the Petitioners' Services:The petitioners challenged the orders dated September 25, 1980, which dispensed with their services as Trust Executive Officers, arguing that these orders were arbitrary, actuated by extraneous considerations, and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The orders were issued under Rule 9 of the Punjab Trust Services (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1978, which allowed the termination of probationers if their performance was deemed unsatisfactory. The respondents contended that the petitioners were still on probation and their services were no longer required due to the dissolution of the Improvement Trusts.2. Period of Probation for the Petitioners:The core issue was whether the probation period for the petitioners was one year or two years. The appointment orders specified a one-year probation period, which the petitioners argued was valid. The respondents claimed this was a clerical error, asserting that Rule 9(1) prescribed a two-year probation period for direct recruits. The court examined the purpose of probation, concluding that Rule 9(1) was directory, not mandatory, and allowed for a shorter probation period. The court held that the one-year probation period specified in the appointment orders was valid, and the petitioners had completed their probation by May 27, 1980.3. Arbitrary and Discriminatory Nature of the Termination Orders:The court found that the reasons provided for terminating the petitioners' services were untenable. The petitioners had completed their probation and had been granted increments, indicating satisfactory performance. The simultaneous termination of all 11 petitioners on the same day, without any specific allegations of unsatisfactory performance, suggested arbitrary action. The court noted that the dissolution of the Trusts did not affect the corporate personality or ongoing functions, and only the petitioners' services were terminated while other staff continued to work.4. Dissolution of the Improvement Trusts as a Pretext for Termination:The respondents argued that the services of the petitioners were no longer required due to the dissolution of the Improvement Trusts. The court found that the dissolution merely dissolved the Board of Trustees, not the Trusts themselves, which continued to function with the same staff, except for the petitioners. The court inferred that the dissolution was a device to get rid of the petitioners, highlighting the arbitrary nature of the action.5. Right to Reinstatement and Compensation:The court rejected the respondents' contention that the petitioners, as temporary government servants, could not be reinstated. Citing the Manager, Government Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa, the court held that arbitrary termination smacks of discrimination, violating the guarantee of equality of opportunity in public employment. The court quashed the termination orders, declared that the petitioners continue to be in service, and directed their reinstatement with full salary from the date of the judgment. For the period between the termination and the judgment, the petitioners were awarded half the salary.Conclusion:The court allowed the petitions, quashing the termination orders and directing the reinstatement of the petitioners with compensation. The action of dispensing with the petitioners' services was found to be arbitrary and discriminatory, violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The court emphasized the directory nature of the probation period rule, validating the one-year probation specified in the appointment orders.
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