Probationary service and equal treatment in public employment: selective termination on untenable grounds was held arbitrary and unconstitutional.

A probation rule framed in enabling terms permitted the appointing authority to fix a shorter probation period than the maximum, and the appointment conditions prescribed one year; the petitioners had therefore completed probation before their services were dispensed with. The Court also found the termination arbitrary because the stated grounds were untenable, the work continued despite dissolution of the trusts, and only the petitioners were singled out. The orders were held to violate Articles 14 and 16, were quashed, and restoration in service with consequential salary relief was directed.

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Issues: (i) whether the prescribed period of probation for the direct recruits was one year or two years under the service rules and appointment conditions; (ii) whether the orders dispensing with the services of the petitioners were arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Issue (i): Whether the prescribed period of probation for the direct recruits was one year or two years under the service rules and appointment conditions.

Analysis: The appointment orders annexed a specific condition prescribing probation for one year. The rule governing probation was construed as enabling and directory, conferring discretion on the appointing authority to prescribe a shorter period up to the maximum of two years for direct recruits. The release of increment after completion of one year also supported the inference that probation had expired and the service was treated as satisfactory.

Conclusion: The probation period was one year, and the petitioners had completed it before the impugned orders were passed.

Issue (ii): Whether the orders dispensing with the services of the petitioners were arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Analysis: The stated grounds for dispensing with service were found untenable. The dissolution of the trusts did not bring the work to an end, since the functions continued, the staff remained, and other officers were assigned the petitioners' duties. The reasons based on surplusage, burden on the exchequer, probationary status, and alleged unsatisfactory performance were rejected. The Court held that the action singled out only the petitioners and was therefore arbitrary and discriminatory in public employment.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were arbitrary and unconstitutional, and were liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to restoration in service with consequential salary relief as directed by the Court, and the challenge to their removal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A probationary-service rule expressed in enabling terms may permit the appointing authority to prescribe a shorter probation than the maximum stated, and a termination that selectively singles out employees on untenable grounds while the work continues is arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

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