Section 9 interim relief follows ordinary injunction principles and may be limited to preserving the arbitral subject matter.

Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act does not displace the ordinary principles for interim injunctions; the court must still assess prima facie entitlement, balance of convenience, irreparable injury, and whether relief is just and convenient, with the law of specific relief remaining relevant. In the mining dispute, limited interim protection was considered appropriate to preserve the subject matter of arbitration by restraining third-party dealings in the same mining arrangement, while no injunction was warranted to stop the lease-holder from carrying on mining operations itself. The broad injunction was refused, and the matter was directed to proceed expeditiously in arbitration.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the power under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 excludes the ordinary principles governing grant of interim injunctions, including the principles under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (ii) Whether the facts justified grant of interim protection restraining termination and third-party mining arrangements, while permitting the lease-holder to carry on mining operations itself.

Issue (i): Whether the power under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 excludes the ordinary principles governing grant of interim injunctions, including the principles under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: Section 9 permits interim measures of protection, but it does not create a special regime divorced from established principles governing interlocutory relief. The court, when asked to grant protective relief pending arbitration, must still consider the usual requirements relevant to injunctions, including prima facie entitlement, balance of convenience, irreparable injury, and whether the relief sought is just and convenient. The substantive law of specific relief remains relevant, and the existence of an arbitration agreement does not by itself dispense with those principles.

Conclusion: The power under Section 9 is not independent of the settled principles governing interim injunctions and specific relief.

Issue (ii): Whether the facts justified grant of interim protection restraining termination and third-party mining arrangements, while permitting the lease-holder to carry on mining operations itself.

Analysis: The dispute arose from a terminated mining arrangement pending arbitration. The Court found no basis to prevent the lease-holder from working its own lease, since that would not cause irreparable prejudice to the applicant and any eventual loss could be compensated. At the same time, allowing the lease-holder to place the same mining opportunity with another party could frustrate the subject matter of the arbitration and disturb the existing arrangement. Limited protection was therefore justified to preserve the dispute pending adjudication without granting the wider injunction sought.

Conclusion: Limited interim protection was warranted only to restrain dealings with third parties for the same mining arrangement, while no injunction lay against the lease-holder carrying on mining operations itself.

Final Conclusion: The cross-appeals were disposed of by affirming the refusal of the broad injunction, granting only a restricted protective order to preserve the contractual subject matter pending arbitration, and directing expeditious arbitration by the appointed sole arbitrator.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 9 interim relief is governed by the settled principles applicable to interlocutory injunctions, and such relief may be tailored only to the extent necessary to preserve the subject matter of arbitration without granting broader substantive protection than the facts justify.

---