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Issues: (i) Whether Section 4(3) of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993, abating pending suits and legal proceedings without an effective alternative dispute-resolution mechanism, was unconstitutional. (ii) Whether the acquisition of the disputed area and the management provisions in Sections 3, 6 and 7 violated secularism, equality, and freedom of religion, including any special immunity claimed for a mosque. (iii) Whether the Presidential Reference under Article 143(1) was maintainable and required an answer.
Issue (i): Whether Section 4(3) of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993, abating pending suits and legal proceedings without an effective alternative dispute-resolution mechanism, was unconstitutional.
Analysis: Section 4(3) extinguished pending civil remedies concerning the disputed area. The reference under Article 143(1) did not answer the core title dispute in the suits and did not substitute an effective adjudicatory forum. Abatement of the suits therefore amounted to denial of the judicial remedy and was inconsistent with the rule of law. The provision was held severable from the rest of the Act.
Conclusion: Section 4(3) was unconstitutional and invalid.
Issue (ii): Whether the acquisition of the disputed area and the management provisions in Sections 3, 6 and 7 violated secularism, equality, and freedom of religion, including any special immunity claimed for a mosque.
Analysis: The Act was construed as an acquisition measure within legislative competence, the pith and substance being acquisition of property. The vesting under Section 3, read with Sections 6 and 7, was treated for the disputed area as limited and transitory, with the Central Government functioning as a statutory receiver pending final adjudication, while the adjacent area vested absolutely. The Court held that acquisition of a place of worship is not barred per se by Articles 25 and 26, because the right to religion does not carry an immunity from acquisition of property, and a mosque under Indian law enjoys no special constitutional immunity beyond other places of worship. Section 7(2), requiring maintenance of status quo at the disputed site, was held not to be anti-secular on the facts.
Conclusion: Sections 3, 6 and 7 were upheld, and the challenge based on secularism, equality, and freedom of religion failed.
Issue (iii): Whether the Presidential Reference under Article 143(1) was maintainable and required an answer.
Analysis: In view of the revival of the suits after invalidation of Section 4(3), the Reference became unnecessary and superfluous. The question referred did not itself resolve the substantive title dispute and was not treated as an adequate substitute for adjudication in the suits.
Conclusion: The Reference was declined and returned unanswered.
Final Conclusion: The Act was sustained in all material respects except Section 4(3), which was struck down. The pending suits were revived, the disputed area remained under limited statutory control pending final adjudication, and the Presidential Reference was not answered.
Ratio Decidendi: Acquisition of property, including a place of worship, is constitutionally permissible if the statute preserves the essential religious freedom and the disputed area is held only for a limited, purposive statutory control; however, abatement of pending suits without an effective substitute for adjudication violates the rule of law and is invalid.