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Issues: Whether the amended Government Order reducing grant-in-aid from 100% to 75% of entertainment tax applied to the petitioner, or whether the State was bound by the earlier promise under the doctrine of promissory estoppel so as to entitle the petitioner to 100% grant-in-aid for the first two years.
Analysis: The petitioner had applied for permission to construct the cinema hall and obtained approval while the earlier Government Order granting 100% reimbursement for the first two years was in force. Acting on that representation, the petitioner purchased land, constructed the cinema hall, and later obtained the licence to exhibit films. The Court held that the petitioner had altered its position on the faith of the State's promise. The State did not place any material showing an overriding public interest for withdrawing or reducing the incentive, nor did it show that the petitioner could be restored to the original position if the benefit were curtailed. In these circumstances, the amended order could operate only prospectively against persons who decided to construct cinema halls after its issuance.
Conclusion: The amended Government Order did not apply to the petitioner, and the petitioner was entitled to 100% grant-in-aid of the entertainment tax for the first two years.