2001 (4) TMI 925 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court clarifies procedure for land disputes under Madhya Bharat Land Act

The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 are not summary in nature, requiring an ... - Issues Involved:1. Whether the proceedings under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 are summary in nature.2. Whether a suit for recovery of possession can be filed without resorting to Section 91 of the Act.3. Whether the filing of an application under Section 91 of the Act interrupts the continuity of adverse possession.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Nature of Proceedings under Section 91 of the Act:The Supreme Court examined whether proceedings under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 are summary in nature. Section 91 allows a pakka tenant dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law to apply to the Tehsildar for restoration of possession within three years from the date of dispossession. The Court held that the proceedings under Section 91 require an inquiry into the title of the applicant, making them not summary in nature. The Court distinguished these proceedings from Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, which allows for restoration of possession without proving title. The Court rejected the contention that Section 91 is akin to Section 250 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, which has been held to be summary in nature by the M.P. High Court, noting that the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act has an integrated scheme that is not in pari materia with the M.P. Land Revenue Code.2. Requirement to Exhaust Remedy under Section 91 before Filing Suit:The Court addressed whether a pakka tenant must exhaust the remedy under Section 91 before filing a suit for recovery of possession under Section 93 of the Act. Section 93 states that no order under Sections 91 and 92 precludes a person from establishing rights and obtaining possession through a regular suit. The Court interpreted this to mean that a pakka tenant must first resort to Section 91 before approaching a civil court under Section 93. The Court emphasized that Section 147 of the Act bars civil courts from entertaining suits on matters that a revenue officer is empowered to decide, indicating an implied exclusion of civil court jurisdiction until the remedy under Section 91 is exhausted.3. Interruption of Adverse Possession by Filing an Application under Section 91:The Court considered whether filing an application under Section 91 interrupts the continuity of adverse possession. Article 65 of the Limitation Act prescribes a 12-year limitation period for suits for possession of immovable property based on title, starting when the defendant's possession becomes adverse. The Court cited precedents establishing that the institution of a suit for recovery of possession arrests the period of adverse possession. The Court extended this principle to proceedings under Section 91, holding that filing an application under this section interrupts the defendant's adverse possession. Consequently, the suit brought by the plaintiff was not barred by limitation.Conclusion:The Supreme Court concluded that the proceedings under Section 91 of the Act are not summary in nature, a pakka tenant must exhaust the remedy under Section 91 before filing a suit under Section 93, and filing an application under Section 91 interrupts the continuity of adverse possession. The Court set aside the judgment under challenge and allowed the appeal, holding that the suit for recovery of possession was not barred by limitation. There was no order as to costs.