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Issues: Whether the prior approval contemplated under Section 20-A(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 had to be granted by the District Superintendent of Police alone and whether approval by a higher police could validate the initiation of proceedings under TADA.
Analysis: Section 20-A(1) vested the power of prior approval in a specifically designated authority, namely the District Superintendent of Police. The Court applied the settled principle that where a statute confers power on a particular authority in mandatory terms, the power must be exercised only by that authority and not by any other officer, even if superior in rank. The requirement involved an application of mind by the designated officer and could not be treated as satisfied by approval of an officer higher in the police hierarchy. The absence of the statutorily required approval was therefore a substantive illegality. The Court also treated the defect as independently sufficient to vitiate the trial.
Conclusion: Prior approval by the District Superintendent of Police was mandatory, approval by a higher officer was invalid, and the trial under TADA stood vitiated for want of compliance with Section 20-A(1).
Ratio Decidendi: When a penal statute mandates prior approval by a specifically designated authority, that approval must be obtained from that authority alone and non-compliance vitiates the proceedings.