Liberal approach to sufficient cause supports condonation of delay in setting aside abatement and limits appellate interference.

"Sufficient cause" for condoning delay in seeking to set aside abatement is to be assessed liberally on the facts of each case, including difficulty in identifying legal representatives and the applicant's absence from the place where the application had to be made. The note further states that a trial court's discretionary order under the Limitation Act should not be disturbed on appeal unless the exercise of discretion is plainly unsustainable. On that approach, the delay was treated as sufficiently explained and the condonation was upheld.

---

---

Issues: Whether the delay in applying to set aside the abatement was sufficiently explained so as to justify exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.

Analysis: The delay was examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, including the difficulty in ascertaining the proper legal representatives, the plaintiff's absence from Calcutta, and the need for communication with him before the application could be made. The standard for "sufficient cause" was treated as one that must be applied with a reasonably liberal approach, and not by an unduly strict or exacting test. The appellate court also noted that discretion exercised by the trial court under Section 5 should not be lightly interfered with where material exists to support that discretion.

Conclusion: The delay was held to be sufficiently explained, and the order setting aside the abatement was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the trial court's discretion to condone the delay was not shown to be erroneous.

Ratio Decidendi: "Sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act is to be construed liberally on the facts of each case, and an appellate court should not interfere with a trial court's discretionary condonation unless the exercise of discretion is plainly unsustainable.

---