Inherent tribunal rectification power upheld; diligent pursuit of remedies did not amount to laches barring writ relief.

A tribunal with plenary jurisdiction was held to have inherent power to correct its own inadvertent omission to decide a ground of appeal, even though the Excess Profits Tax Act contained no express rectification period and the limitation in section 20 or section 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, did not govern such an application. The court treated the failure to dispose of an argued ground as a manifest error capable of correction and held that the rectification request was not time-barred. It also found no laches under article 226 because the petitioner had diligently pursued available remedies, so writ relief could not be refused on delay alone.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain an application seeking rectification of its own inadvertent omission to dispose of a ground of appeal, despite the absence of an express period of limitation under the Excess Profits Tax Act; (ii) whether the petitioner was guilty of laches so as to bar relief under article 226 of the Constitution.

Issue (i): Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain an application seeking rectification of its own inadvertent omission to dispose of a ground of appeal, despite the absence of an express period of limitation under the Excess Profits Tax Act.

Analysis: The statutory scheme contained a clear omission because the Excess Profits Tax Act did not expressly provide for rectification by the Tribunal in respect of its own mistakes. The Court held that neither the four-year period in section 20 of the Excess Profits Tax Act nor the limitation under section 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, governed such an application where the Tribunal itself had failed to deal with a ground argued before it. Relying on the principle that every court or tribunal of plenary jurisdiction has an inherent power to prevent miscarriage of justice and correct grave or palpable errors, the Court held that the Tribunal could rectify its own inadvertent mistake.

Conclusion: The Tribunal erred in rejecting the application as time-barred, and the petitioner's request for reconsideration was maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner was guilty of laches so as to bar relief under article 226 of the Constitution.

Analysis: The petitioner had been continuously pursuing remedies through appeals, reference applications, and applications before the revenue authorities and the Tribunal. The Court found that the petitioner was not sleeping over his rights and that any resort to the wrong remedy did not amount to such delay or negligence as would justify refusal of relief in writ jurisdiction. The earlier proceedings also did not produce any finding on the question whether the application before the Tribunal was barred by time.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not guilty of such laches as would disentitle him to relief under article 226.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded and the Tribunal's order rejecting the rectification application was set aside, with a direction to decide the application afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal of plenary jurisdiction has an inherent power to rectify its own inadvertent omission or manifest mistake where no express statutory limitation governs such rectification, and diligent pursuit of alternate remedies does not by itself amount to laches barring writ relief.

---